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PJIENIIEN'iIAL INABILITY
MONDAY APRIL 1, 1D57
LINITRIn STTE tl61tSI (IFJ It I'll YNATiV E4,
COMAIhsiri: ,N THEJ JUDICIARY,
Snw,(II SI t(?omiMltFJ* 'Po STItit 1'hblm iJJnTiAl" I NAHIITiY,
Washington, DA 6'
Thii B8iI)CevijHJ( tt'i ijel, purti~il to cail ni 10:07 ft. mn. in roomr
: 4 0Ni o 6) th ( 01d' ioust' Offlkt, illditig, 1lon. I,' innia1 ('oiler elnirmnan
of Hieo SItibeoiititte) piresiing.
Present: Uteproseii(ti ve8 I'Kiiiet (Ceitel Otiafirnhin), F'ratcis M.
Yvnlte1r, Jnrk flrookEI, lKeImti6a It. K~ehlti g, all ( 1%liiirn im. MeC0iloc0a.
(~auIt, -etmy an re, -fnd WI iliii It. Folov, genera I consei
(The coitinittee lind unadetm consideration t he following reollatiomn'
JO1INT It1H(I1.ITION irP 1.1101,ing ninenrint t Iy 11w tII~itm of Ume UnltA SI~Ic re1hting to
raaeswliere thel 1'1 ~nt Is unah!a to itschvarge the powers arml diatkg of fils office
Itrsolrcsl by ithe Sennfe and House of liereRCiltItimC. of the United StIairs of A merica
it (Con gri seniblefl (iwvo-tirds of reh House coneurring therelts) Tha11t tile follow-
Wa nrih "I '1lropoM'dl as nit fhnenditneilt to tlie ("011 tlit foil of 10 1.nited Staters,)Itll Wi v'slid to nil i1ttmits An1( prorposo, us patrt of thle Gollssltutioa whlen
Witled by thie legislattares of thiree-fou rthi of Itle several Slte-;':
"ARTICLE-
"8Iftriox I. 111 cast of the remioval of [lit,' ir'idenit ftwin oWeie, or of Ills deftil
or Iresiguntion, thle Vice i'resdent shall become I.'reidorit.
'$m~e. 2. If thao Presidient htitloutces tiatdlhe 1I% unable to (ll~chmtr A the powers
tItildutiles tif 111ffollice, sttt'it p)owetrs and( duties shlld devolve oilth 11(1Vce President.
l$aw. 3. Thea Coligresm mray by n colaialrrnt re~itation npproVed by two-thirdi
of each House, siggest tlint thle'lresident is unable to dischiarge the powers and(Ititlff- of Is office. For tile plarluost of considering such i acoticurrent resolution.
thie Vice 1'resdeni. maiy conivene, the -teMiate mad the 81.eaker of the IJOIL of
hleprese11nntts maly conveneo the Ron."e of Itejre.'vntativ.-i.
"if thle Congsresm suggests thatd the President Is uionbie to discharge the powers
and1( daime of 1 ml,% omeeo, tile Supremo Court AA~II doterinhie whether or not tile
Pro. Ideltui Is abile to (Iiscilintic such 1)owes and1(lttle*. It time t111)r0111 Cotirt
tlcterim intht tile ilresidit i- iinaftie to (lk-imnrg(- suim PloWers andt dutieR, thoy
sinil devolyc on tlie Vice'lPreAd(Int..
"Su.v. 4., If Iltu owers and duties of the PrcsItiet ulevove br time Vice President
puIrsuant to section 2 or 3 of ills article *tho exercise of stich power and dutiest
54111111 not b)1 restlmled by the* President iumih thle Su remei Couti on the reques(-t of
Int Presdidet, deterilttes tlitt the Presidenut li at)ie to (1 kehiarge the power and
4thmti~ of flsoffice.
"S8y:e. 6. The1 Congress may by law lImpleentt thle fort-going seetiomus of tis
article. I
"Sse. 0. rThe Congress mnay by law provide for the ci.e of removal, decath,
resgIgnation or inAbily, bothi of tfhe' residemit and Vice PresIdent, declaring what
officer AhNl then act As P'resident, and suchi officr shiall act accordingly, untilI
the disabill ty be Omenot'ed, or at Pre,41dent shall be elooted.
"18v.C. 7. Civille 0 of section I of article It of tile Contitutionm of tile Unrited
Stat es i. hereby repealed.
I'll P-81 DHNTI At# INAIIIIATY
448mv. 8. TI tin ntl Mo z4hal I m)l opply 16 it toy pormim lioldhig t1wollivoof I Iremideitt.
whoti flits no(elt, wit-4 proposed It%- We Cmigrmq.
-$0w. 11. Tills firtlelo 1411oll IN% hiopimilve milt-m I( slinit linvil lovvii rittilled Its;
IM to III(, C"oll-AIII III lon by flit, Ivg1,4jliWrt%t of Ilirve-foitir(lis or tilt,
t(I'Voll'Al 114111tv.-A withill Sevell yvilt4 from flit, dato tit It-4 Subill isill Ill."
III. J. 10.4. 'AM-Mill Colig , Ist
JOINT IMS4111,11OTIoN, 11(shlillot to Ilw ItI41114111 o( 11W Prosilivnit lodc-tekoll, lite 111111mot
IX Allm
flesoll-rd 10.1i the Scmite flood 114)II-St, of of thr 1101ited ovildr-11 of
Amcf-icti its CmIgIrs.4 el"I'wil bled, 'I'lltil. Ill Vast, or tilt% W1110vil (tit flit, I'mAdvoil from
police, or tit hN demb or to,ilgiialloil, Ow VIct, Proslilow Shall to villll Pre"64,111'.
2. If flit% Pres1doW mmminvog flint lit, Is muildo III oil.-tv;,mrgv tilt, power
111111 q1titil", of his 0111m, .4111011 I)mvc,'4 will 11tilit's A11111 111moll tile, Vivo
Pre.-ItIvIlL i
8vv. :1. Wholiever I he \ IVA% 11".41411vill or Illo ix-r.44111 11vNI lit I Ito Illiv or 2411( . .- Im.
lit Ilw Pro-tidetivy Im mils14 l thrit flit, Proslilmil, Air fhP INTS011- 010" Ill-.4011111 014
I Ito loowerr. mid Jullos kit mahl 4ifflets, ti4 IN% vik-so Wity Iv. N ittimble it) dischitrgo stild
Ivoul-N tillil 4111114", 1411011 IK".oll -NIP'll C011vV110 11001 11011so-4 A)( tilt) (N)"Aro-m imil
amitimice that flit- powers alld 4111fivs of the offlef. litwit di'volved 111H)tl 111111.
INce. 4. If flit, loowe" 11ml 111111t..'t of 11110 Pre'AL-111 ilt'volve, Allmon [illy PPNOII
N m"ittkill 14) -wellolls 12 nild A of-tIlis rl"Collilloll. 
tho mi-rels4l. I)( Suell loowt'N 111141
ifflo"; MitAll lit, romitilml Ioy fho Port,%sidoid tilwit flit, loreshiviii's of
Ili,, abilily mi4l 111(viltIoll 111vivilixill (to I-osilmo.
lit. J. It(". WI.Mill Colig . 1-ti w'%1.I
)0I\ 11 IMOOLUTION 1111swhig all citiW111111W10 Its Ow ColIA1111114,111 of 11W Ittkilml SlAtm relMilig 10
(ww% bullock, 11%, Pov"Alcill 1% 1111.14% 1011t-WIM190 I1W [4MVISMUI IttlikA 0l 11I.XtIll1w
11'esolve.? hythr Scolatellpid Howce Ott Urpresentatire.4 ofthe Vnitnt Slate-c tof America
in gvvt (vixemblot (ttm-thirds qf rach House copireirdoill therciti), ThA tho (ill.
14mllig arilell, 1-4 11mi"sett 1w im 111111011(immit1o tilt, C011,411111tioll of (Ike Pulted
wilell nitifivil by t1le logislat uro:% it( thret-Gitirl1w of flit% st , vend Hinit-4:
44
to Sv(*r1t)X 1. Ill 10A,41L, tit flip mm-mil of (he 11n,61dent from collie, or of Ilk death
or rekigtiation, flit, Vloo Ilm-4tIvid sliall Iwoomo President for flit,, imexpIrM portion
of fit%,, then curmil form,
11$rw-. 2. H Ow- Pre.4doid still doolaro lit wailing HIM Ito 1.4 11111%lile 14) disellorgo
tho owers mid dutlos ofl& offlex- imelt powers mul dollies Ainil lov, ditchuged lwy
f1w, Viet Prmidmit. im Acting
"$Kv. 3. R (he Pro.4dent does not so deolaw,, flip Viet, ProAdviiI, If eallifled of
(lit, IWA4101WS 111,411111ty, allit-ii1wit nliproval lit wrlilug of n majority of (lit, livatis
tit 01,0011tive itelmrt tilt-, it Ut Who am Ilielitbem of the Proskletit's Cobluet., sliall di.q.
chArge tile wim. alid dullos of tho oflim ns Aelhig PreMdent.
"Sre. 4. Wilellover tho Prosilletit. declartm Ili wrlthig that Id-A limbility Is let-
1111liated, tilt, Phkitto.Ilt attliall forlitwIlit discharp the liowtvs and dutIO of 1;1.-4 office.
"Srw. 5. I'llist article shall I)v Inoperative k1fil mm It sh"ll have becli rittiflc4l its nit
AllIentinloalt to (Ito coll-millitfoll by lite legislaturms or threv-fourths of flit% moral
malw* within seven poam from tile dalk iYf Its milmilssloil."
Ill. J. Ilm UN. S-Sth votts., Ist 'w.sml
JOINT M-I1kvt1tvj an anwoomew to tho Consiltuilm of tho Voilloat States rvtilttig to Otto
Inswbility of Ibe PrMdent to tMcchwst, tho powers and adults of ht$ office
i
Rtsolivri by the Setink amd House qf Hirpresentatires of the United Mates of America
in Compress trusemblM (hro-thirds of orach House emieurring therein) That tho (ollow-
Ing artick Lc pm)IxxAx1 as an amendilletit, to tho collst It lit 1011 of t1lo 11111ted States,
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wtilell f4111011 be4 v'nlld (0 till intentsi and ititil )Isl0eL itt4 part of flni (oia till [oil wheun
rallf tI1, lie legbiiat irv' of htrofirulw of th me 'trtl Htatv'4:
''vv
4gutg 1. 'iThat IIi(4I viof tlhe rinuivill i (fiv' I're41ileit (roin ollive, or of lii
deh'll, or n-M&Aidti, fitn Viev I'roe1ttnt d1"l1 bliit. 1're~dliti.
'8;.2. If I(he tresideWi. iitiinoie" flint lie N iitiiiblt' to (lisetiInrg(' the flowers
ittl dot liv. of flmi otflev, sitelt jKiWt't nd dIti MlIMI fl(1VOIve tpoti fl. Vice
",re :1. Whelhoitver (lie' %'ici' 1'rvsidlit or t It person n tiifhi hue of snlteemloi
1o fte 'rt'iAliite Is snilmblle'dth Ifn flit, l'rv'i ntf, or flii' rso j ~l ivitai din'hiarglnj
f li%' liowevri nutfiilt'n of stild ollive, as tIml vtv~o uIv bt. Is 1analile to di1.ellArge Nallt
liovw~'i niid i 111(14, stiet' pl'rsoititl convene1 COIVIii l t1I101l14'4 (if t it', Cofl) r84 anud
a11llii 11t1t.ui~ (lie po1weiv nid dluttt'14 of lite Office hiave' devolved tipoll 111111.
4$e . If lIie liowears itud tlnlies (of I he IPresidenit deIvoilve oo )0 Ally ipersoui
iiluuiilanI to twelloito 2 id :1 of 110-14 rt'eoiltoi, ft, e ixirlg~ (f surb povero aint
dhiltbii 1srill hi' re.'uiiiie'd b%. (tou 1'res.ldlvnt Iljlii filie 1 resideiit's. 11iinoiuileineiit, of
him~ nbliyvid Inte'ntion tliireuioii Ito remiiane.
'i4tx. h,. This nrilelt' shiall be Iiiolivrntivo uitsnl' It s~hall have bet-i ratified as
fil 111ildinint to file' mn CI iltlonl by (Ileg'lsAntuires of fliree-fourilis of the
i'ovieril tSin wiflttli sotive ers y it roiti (It n. ihtt of itsl iiksos'
A Il I , '.' 1,4 4-WII int 11 Iv'it It* iteicriiet ii% itiitilhiy of n I,". Metcit rne 014'nr Ing mt President to
Are it erit toil 191 hr S'nude soul l16pi of Rtepresrentative of the. 1nitded NM/es of
A1 uneri iston o. x timirmh/ed, ThnI elinpier I of title :4 (of the Ufnited Mtatem C.ode
is4 Itiinif I n.4olos(1) Add, at I lie end'iiif Ilii' nuinhysls4 of si'i elhapter, liii' following:
1,21. lenihA101 kii tl 1bilit y ('ottitdsin."
(2) Add, tmni'lntely foltowlig (lit p~resenit text, ftie following niew setlon:
"'(a) lPor file put 10-40 of dfloernihulg the(, liiabillt of file l'resideit, to dbechnrfe
(fI pow en'siu d iui Os of thei Offite ofl Prosillent, wI thin Mhe ieanIng of steetlon 9
oIf (flm-i 11th', therei lIm hereby vistablished n coinitislttt to be' known as thp l1'resitoni-
Ini inbilily Coiuinsslon (hiereinfter called Mle '(Coiniilm.4fon').
"1(b) 'Thtn ("01unauiissflu shall be c'olipmoe(I ex olielo of tenl nietaborN wt follows:
"(M 'l'it' V'iet, Presideint shrill serve its (I'inlnnu of flie (Coiniioslon Wit. If by
r'uisKOulit dent h, re.4l gtiutlou, re'novih fraii Olev, Iiniilt~y or fillitlr o q ual ify,
tlori N Itno Vice l'reslont, or If fthie Vicm Prieslut hAtll Ion acting m. President, flhe
Individunal next III H~ne, of ticeesslout to the0 power; and dulie of tile Office of
l'rcsldetit, as defonnined It% setion 11) of thig title, shall serve us such Chalrmiln.The ("hIiriaua 1111ill have nto vote InI flit procecdiigg of file Conitnisso.41
"()'I'tie ChIlef Jumtiee of lte thiulted States.
"(:3) ''hie senior AK,.ocIato Jutlcow of thei Siiprenie Court of (lie tUnited Blalet'.(.)The S9peatker of the House of Ttopresentattves, bitt. If isuichi Speaker shall 41
tile Cluarinui of the Conuiinsslon, thle leader in (lit', Hlouse of flop nesentaltveA oW!
the pl~oitical parfy harvling thle great(-A, nurnber of Nieniberis of the House of
ltelresnltatives.
"(6) 'io leaden fi the House of Itepresentaflve.4 of file political party havingfile second grenfest nltnmber of Memnbers of tlie htotis of hleprosentatives.
ofde() The leader fit the Seiaate of the Political party having tho greatest numberof leinbem of thie Senate.1(7) Th'le leader III thle Hepnte of the political PiartY having the second greatest
nuutnber of Memibers of thle Senafe.( 8) Tile Seen'tary of State.
:(0 The Secretary of the Treasury.
"(10) The Attorney (boom)a.(o) Seven inenbem of tho CoinmnKtso shall coustititte a quorant. The con.
currenco tIII writing of at least six inembers shall be required for any action toD ho
taken, or any determination mnade, by the Coinumlon.
PlIE8IIJENTIALe ANAMJLITY
14(d) Mllbom of the 'oieeitls,0oee shlenl Qervo un 14110li ifthaIiL eolippeisilf [ile:
Wiet flet% sleull be reflicbirsedl (or fravel, seiftsisteicee, mcid oftler ncemsary pxqweeve4
Ieierreel I)%- flite fit file ;xWrormlep of tlie uflee wvedli (I-lee CouIeIkd~b'oe.11(p) If, III it ee opliloli of file l'remslrti, ie( Is tnmble (o (lischnrg Ito fleIwwers
ned eiie of the 0111wc of I'resienct, lie pleceht so notify the (!Chlrimme of thle t'ocee-
eiilssloe by writteie coeiei 111111eellulle t reveijet of ntiv 81ete l il IIIileafltoll,
or eIpluil receipt of it CoiieeeiwIleat ioee front aie1)nv (firme icettiirs of the minleeisslit
steatleig tlhat they- Iimite seifficeit ceetise to befleve fith flm1rsidvent Is ceiceelo to
1 rfole e Vers awl ties of (tip Offlie of Presidentf, the Chinirui sleii
I((A0 The ('oliiketon Alhall seek vocilpecelit meIcAml nelvle as to 111 lectditflo or
(lie 1 restetece did lets abelltt to dtkeleurge thle powel.Rs 111)ed dii te of Ids offlie.. If,
basedl 11e)4)1 fe~iflclegs, thec' Coeeficii.0ssioii sliall eteletiilece f lint the 1'resleent is
tceiale to disele ite heolerm cited dities of thle 001cc' or I'reAdeeit , miuch powers
ned deies shiciu ft erce ipoit devolve 11)1(ipo the iiedividia next III huei of sieceesioll
to the 1" PrIdcele, am elteililed loeriseeciect to sretin 110 of (Ie,; tite.
11(g) UIn (elie oIpinlil of (lee Priisieliet, lie Is able at ally ti11e0 to rC~Ls.4ilitv the
owwers ated dcette's Of fle (jice of t'iesidonii, tie Annd so Inotify thee yCh rnitree of
fle C'ommeissione 6by writtee roeeeeeeneleat(loll. lI)oce rocelpt of ceecy such comeeutel-
Catiol, thle ('hiriiinee sh.41h Convence flie (Coeeceeehsioll wiitorct delay andt (lie ('oul-
liet.*Stoll All 0obt11in Coliptieleit iceed11il advice na to fil% Coinditione *of fle P'residenet
mied him nbihttv to dlischaeeril he potter need uheefl of let 0111em If, Imiqed mipoce
Sueche cidvice, thle ('OIeeiisioiN11 shll defercetno falithe dtisalhity lens beece removed,
and ftiat flee P~re-4ieet is able to reevieeeme thi e r id deites of te Offlee of
President, It shill teutify I lie Presidenct nmid fle I I Ieee aoret lug h'resldeei of its (hvelsloui
by writtenc comueife, aitd ftee reshleeif seheill fle eacssieeee flee- lowers meeid
dettles of tlie 001ccv of I'resident.
11(h) Whencever any inielvltictal is4 nclelig its Presieet, or leas ndced as h're~dectjeec rsaet to flee jerov-isici of wetoc 111) of flis title, flee word 'P'resideint,'$ as uqsed
Iii tleis section, MhIAh be decerreed to rvfer to flint induividimcl uande the wVord 'I'resl-
deiecv', as ived ci flis sectioni, sliath be deeed~ to ceenefle powers ned ditfes of
the Office of Plrestifeiif2
Thie (e.CeIIAIRM . Thle comneiltee w~I oill inorder~.
Woare pleased to litve wit i us this morning the Attorney Oetierl1.
Mr. At torney (ieral, you meay proceedI.
STATEMENT OF HON. HERB3ERT B3ROWNELL, JRa, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED BY RON. WAL-
LIAM P. ROGERS, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITtD
STATES
Mr. IBitowxt:.-m. Mt'. (linirnian, members of Ite commtiittee the
problem of inability of at President to discharge (lice powers and (I uties
of hiis office ini case of illnes or other unexpected emnergoey hans been
of serious concern to our Nation for- many y'ears. Itecently both the
executive anid legislat ivo brancies of our clovernnt have beon giving
intensive consideration to lte clarificftlon anid improvement of otur
constittulioeal system rehatin'eg to sutch. inability.
At. the direction of President. Eisenhiower, which was originally
v en some time ago, I bielievo in January 1050, t hcaye been cone-
tuimg at special study ofithis problem and ami prepared this miorneing,
in response to thle in~vitation from this subcommittee, to present a
plan approved by htim. fle hias authorized me to Say titat1 inl his
opinion t action to amend theie (Constitution is requiredI to eliminate
unlcertainty and to provide for thie orderly condc.ogoe m ntn
time of future crises due to ak Presid~nt.'s ability to act,. I am also,
aithlorrAe to say for him thiat. the plhan whieh' I will present, this
m1orni provided a workable and equi1table solution whkhe lie recoin-
mend for fAvorable consideration by tlie Congress.
PRESIDENTIAL 1INABILl T Y
Before readiglwi the ext of the proposedI coistitutiiloil a0 l(itnendnltl,
I will descrihrit(1( p.ii iepal provisions.
A niajor provision of tlie plan is to make it, 6liindantly clear tliiit,
in the evejit of a president's inability, the Vive President wOiIll sekve
only ns Acing President, and only' during the coiltInuation of 1ihp
Presidential inability, and the Presi(lent would resume fle exercise Of
the 11OWe01r finld dlti'es of his office as 80011 as ien was again able to act.
T ..ie plnif tutfkepirovision for two tpes of miliinfions which involve
'Presidekiifil inability:
'li fist is: If a'l'resldent should heconie uilable to discharge (lie
powers mid duties of his office and1( so (lelare tlint in writing, (lien the(
flico President would become Acting Presi((elit for tlhe period of
inability. Whenever (lie President is again able to act, lie could so
declaree and lie would thereupon resume fhie powers and duties of his
office.
It is nly opinion that, this provision, stani(ng by itself, would prob-
ably take care of most cases of Presidential inability; but, I realize a
second type of situation might arise in the event--
'I'Ie (1AIRMAN. Do you mind being interrupted, or do you prefer
to conclude your statement first?
Mr. BROwN:LL. I will suit your convenience on that, Mr.Ghairman.
It might be well for me to go alead n(l present my prepared state-
ment, but. whatever you want to (lo is perfectly all right.
'The CAIIMAN'. In the case of President Garfield, I wonderWhether
he was in a positioii to state in writing whether lie was disabled.
Mr. Bihow'mai., As we will come to it a little later, there weretimes
during that convalescent period whiei. wouldn't have been able to
do that. But, as I say, (here is a second type of situation which might
arise in the event tlht a President is unable or unwilling to declare
his inability, so (lint the plan provides for such case, and says that the
Vice President, if lie is satisfied of (lie President's inability, and upon
approval in writing of the majority of the heads of the executive de-
partments, who are members of (ie President's Chbinet, shall dis-
charge the powers and duties of (lie office as Acting President.
Now, this, you will note, is not for action by tie Cabinet alone,
but action by the Vice President upon approval, in writing, of the
majority of the members of the Cabinet..
TiV i1eiAIIiMAN. May I ask who initiates it, there-tho President or
the Vice President?
Mr. Bitowi.EL,. It could be either one. I will come to it a little
later.
WVhenover tlie President in this case again becomes able to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, lie may reassume them by declaring
in writing that his inability has terminated; and. if we want. to go to the
extreme, ultimate case, where a President might endeavor to act,
although clearly unable to (o so I believe the present. constitutional
provisions for impeachment could be relied upon and appear to be
ad(leuate.
Now, just one other preliminary observation, and that is this:
That. this plan, even if it receives prompt and favorable consideration
by the Congress, probably would not become effective duringg the
second term of President Eisenhower because as we all know after
congressional approval, it has to be submitted to the various States
for consideration and action.
00832-57--2
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T11 IiiAIRMArj. Mr. Attorioe' Mineral, doesn't this arise front the
emergency of thle Presideit's illness?
Let.'s fAce facts. There is tiothilng personal about, the matter, but1 don't lihlik the matter would live been Vresented so pointedly to
the Nation, ni( I don't think the Presidentr likewise would have rflised
the question mid we certainly -might not have dealt with it as we have,
for a contslerable period of time were it not for the doui10le illins. of
tile President and II order to cope with that emilergenlcy.
Now, if we are going to have a co, itittittional aneindlient, is you
indicate, tlilel we Are not covering, shall I say the present einergency
because of the illness of the Presitlent, and why should we wait,?
Mr. luowm ' i,. Well, I will come to that inl soine detail as we go
along. As a matter of faet, I have a whole section of this l)reptired
statemelnt In which I deal wth that, subject; but I would not. agree
thant there i8 any present emtergelly, III ally real se-se--
Mr. I(EATINo. u hr. CIrlalrnl.
M\r. llnowxvFuI. That calls for aetion, and I would stress rather,
we mu st take the long-range viewin'llt on this for tile best Interests
of our countir in futture crises.
Tlhat. is the way- I woidd like to have us look at it.
Mir. l.Evrtxo. MNIr. Chairman.
The CIt . I only stress tie point tlint this question might liot
have come u1l) at all were it not. for the illness of the President.
While an emergency is not it pleasant thing to contemplate, we are-
let's face the f(ts- presented with a degree-let's put, it that way-
of an emergency, lnd that is why I think I got. actually interested ili
this matter.
Mr. KEAT No. Mr. Chairman., I don't agree we are faced With any
emergency and my interest in this question arose long before the illness
of President Iiseihmower. I didn't have at.\ bill it, but I have been
interested in this subject. for years and I think we would make a great
mistake if we tried to legisl te here simply for any one President or
any\ one situation. We must, look at this objecti6ely, as something
wlich is going to stand for years and must stand the test. of years.
I have made tel sIuggetion-and I will be glad if the Attorney
General could comment on it during the course of his testimony-
that we proceed by a two-pronged attack oni this problem.
Most students fel, I think, that a law is suffilent, but, a great, many
students of the problem have indicated also that they thought a
constitution amendment ig necessary; and the constitutional atnenid-
ment is the procedure advocated by'the Attorney General.
I see no objetion- ant not sure there is precedent for it, but I
see no objection-to our legislating and at the same time starting a
constitutional amendment through the process, which would, as the
Attorney General has said, take a good many years; but, In suggesting
that I do not in any way mean to imply that there is any reason for
any hurry in this "matter. I don't , think that, exists, and I don't,
tlnnk that this committee should legislate with that thought in mind.
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, this committee hias been proceeding at
a very leisurely pace oil this matter.1 There has been no hurry. We
have been wrestl ing with it since 1955. There has been no attempt
to hurry it.
I want: to say also, wen I am speaking of the statute or the con-
stitutional amendment, this is not, Just to cover the present situation,
but it. is for the future also.
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I think that the present situation exacerbates this lack of specificity
on the part, of tie foundifig fathers in reference to article II, section 1,
clause 6.
I think we ought to jump into the bieacll and act, aitloigh not
hastily, buti net in a way that will n&eet the present conditions as well
as future conditions.
I am tinot mnrried to any part icular plan, but I think we should act,
anti act. expediti6usly.
A (onstitutntf1 rlne i~t would take probably 2 to 4 years or
at, best, probably 3 years. Some legislatures meet bianinually, and
the longer we wait the longer we postpone the decisionn, and the less
likelihood there will be any action.
I simply use this dillulcuty under which we are now laboring as a
means to propel thisthing to, s h1l I s.,y, quicker fruition.
Mr. WArIr. I tliiik it, is a very unfor, inate thing that lhe 'Presi-
dent's physical condition should he associated with this legislation.
This is not, a new proposal. It has been suggested many years ago.
Nobody ever Went, to the limit., but. this is not a new proposal.
Mr.1BnoWNEL,. I thank the-Congressman for that statement
because I believe it, to be true, and I think this subcommittee deserves
a great. appreeition for the facl they are seriously considering this
really as a part of realizing we live in an atomic age. * The Government
is makn g all sorts of plans for the orderly continuation of Government
in the event of emergency. We have all of our relocation program
and a itiumber of other StAtutes that are. being considered, and( anyone
who thoughtiilly considers the realities of the atomic age must realize
that the solutioh of this problem, of continuation of orderly govern.
meant in the event a President is unable. to act, is no longer to be con-
sideredl as an exercise in theoretical constitutional law, but it is a
practical problem of government which must. be met, and without
undte (lelay.
Now, with those preliminary remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would like
to come to the text of the prOlosed joint resolution for amendment to
the Constitution which I an presenting for your consideration today.
I will read the exact, language, if I may, and it is:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatires of the UJnited States in
Congress (wo-thirds of cach House concurring therein), That in lieu of so much of
paragraph 6 of section I of article II of the Constitution of the United States as
relates to the powers and duties of the Presidential office devolving on the Vice
President in the ma.e of the removal of the President from office, or of his death,
resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the mid office, the
following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution, which shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the
legislatures of three-fourths of the States:
"JOINT RESOLtUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Unitedt States relating
to cases wbere the Presklent Is unable to discharge the powers and lutes of his office
ARTICLEE --
"SEcrIoN 1. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President for the unexpired portion
of the then current term.
"1SEc. 2.-
and now we come to inability-
"If the President shall declare In writing that he Is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.
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"Six. .3. lWthe President does not so declare, the Vice President, If satisfied of
the President's Inability, and upon approval In writing of a Majority of the heads
of executive departments who are members of the President's Cabi net, shall dis-
charge the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
"Ssc. 4. WVhenever'the President declares in writing that his Inability is ter-
minated, the President shall forthwith discharge the powers and duties of his
office.
"Sre. 5. This article shall be Inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as
an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
several States within seven years from the date of its submission."
T'ihe CHAIRMAN. In section 3 you Wve the question raised in the
first instance by the Vice President, with the approval of the Cabinet.
In other words, the Vice President raises the question, with the
approval •
Mr. BROWNULL. Not necessarily, Mr. Chairman.
It might be better for me to go through with my description of my
thoughts on the plan. I am sure it will answer tlese questions as we
go along, if that is agreeable to you.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
Mr. BROWNELL. First, I would note that this text would be stb-
stituted for part of paragraph 6 of section 1 of article II of the present
Constitution, and I think in order to have our problem cleitly in mind
I had better read that paragraph 6, section I of article I hi tho present
Constitution. The part that is underlined here in the text is the part
that would be eliminated and the new text that I read would be sub-
stituted for it. The part that. would be superseded reads as follows:
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation,
or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall
devolve on the Vice President, ** *
The balance of this present provision would stay in, and that, reads:
* ** and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death
resignation, or inability both of the President and Vice President declaring what
office shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
Mr. WALTER. 'May I ask a question at that point?
Mr. BROWNELL. Yes.
Mr. WALTrEn. How would you enforce section 4?
Mr. BROWNt;L. That would be by declaration in writing by the
President.
Now this morning
Mr. k ATINo. May I just raise a question about section 3?Mr. BnOWNE:Lj. Yes, sir.
Mr. KIEATi-Xo. The words "the President's Cabinet" are not found
in other laws, I believe. I could be mistaken.
Mr. BRowk.LL. There are a whole series of laws passed by the Con-
grm- establishing the heads of the executive departments, and we
ave taken this phrase verbatim from that series of laws.
There are 10 now, as you know; heads of executive departments
who are members of the President's Cabinet.
Mr. KEATIN.O. In other words does "Ihead of an executive depart-
ment" apply only to a department whieh is established as such by
Congress?
Mr. BoWNEMLL. That is correct.
Mr. KEATI'O. In other ords-
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Mr. BRO)WNELL. Just here in the past few years you have established
the Department of Health, EducAtion, and - welfare, and that became
the 10th executive department the head of which is a member of the
President's Cabinet.
Mr. KEATINO. Is a head of an executive department ever not ill the
President's Cabinet?
Could that happen?
\I. BitOWxELL. I suppose it could happen it the President: de ired
to have it so, but there have been 105 years of history uniformly
adopting the Cabinet as being the heads of the executive (eI)artments,
who are recognized by the Congress as the heads of the executive
departments.
Mr. KEATING. This seems to leave a measure of control in the
President as to whether or not tley are members of the Cabinet.
Would it be objectionable to just say '"heads of executive departments"
without using that phrase "who* are members of the -Prsident's,
Cabinet"?
Mr. BROWNELL. I don't believe you would want to do that. My
Offhand opinion would be that the President shoulI have a certain
flexibility there.
Mr. KEATINO. My point is: Such an agency as, let's say, tho
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and some of the other alpha-
betical agencies are not, executive departments.
Mr. BROWNELL. None of them is recognized bv Congress as such,
'is heads of executive departments; no.
Mr. KEATINO. I am a little hemitant about. the use of the word in
a constitutional amendment, since it does not appear in other laws.
That is why I am asking the questions.
Mr. BROWNELL. I think you have a good point there, anid that,
certainly was our thought in putting in the phrase, which is so well
recognized by the Congress over a period of years, that is, "heads of
executive departments who are members of the President's Cabinet."
The CHiRMAN. We now have 10,don't we?
Mr. BROWVNELL. Ten; that is cOrrect.
Now, this morning I would like to divide my statement into threeparts: First is a statement as to reasons why ac tion in this matter
is needed;
Second is a statement of reasons why a constitutional amend-
ment rather than a statute is needed; and
Th'd is a statement of reasons why the proposed plan is
preferable, seems preferable to us, to any oth e proposals thathave
been made up 'to date.
First why is. action needed at all?
It is because there is now no. agreement c0neorniiug the stttis"and
tenure of a Vie: iPresident during tll o inabilit. ifihe Promident.
There are .re e.ted ''tWdents of the CNfistithioh who have on-
tended that 1the Vicd President would merely act as Presidenit f4* th6
duration of th inability, and there are other:iepekod it.udefittiif the
Cointitufioro Who haveargued that'ihe VicerPresident woidd'aetu*1ly
6ec6me Presiderit and rcpface the disabled Presidejit for 't.l, hiahiider
of the term.
This demonstrates, in ilself,1 'he: angedf iav"it Alib rliht o' exer-
cise executive power :bedouded l'y anbtgitfyi' cofu io , and'think _A.le ni hitory wobld lustraewa, h&'d-u ay
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It, was soon after President William Ilenry lfarrison dked in 1841
that. Senator William Allen of'Ohio objected to the establishment, of
the precedent of the Vice President becoming President upon tie
death of tihe President. I)ecause he could see that, precedent would
complicate the situation In the future when a President became dis-
abled aind, as Ie indicated, a study of the records of the constitutional
convention shows that a Vice President was not intended to become
President under the sticession clause. 'lhe succession clause caile
about in this way, find I think historically it. is interesting: When the
original draft, of the constitutional convention was sent to the Com-
Iittee on Style, it contained two separate clauses dealing Witli Presi-
dential siiccesson. One provided that. (lie Vice President shoul
exercise thosePresideitlal powers and dutiesand flite other empowered
tle Congress to designate nit officer to act as President, in certain con-
tingencies, and each of these two clauses was modified by a clause
Which would Ilimit the tenure of the Acting President to th dliratioli
of the disability.
Then, as I say, it. wont to the Committeo oil Style which, of course,
had no authority to alter substantive )rovisions, but merely to !ult
them in clear and concise language, and what they did is what resulted
in the ambiguity. They consolidated these two provisions into one
and introduced the phlraseology: "'the same shall devolve on the Vice
President."
The committee used this limiting clause "until the disability be
removed" only once instead of twice, instead of using it to modify each
of the preceding clauses separately undthey changed the semicolon
to a comma so that. the clause would{ be a part of a continuous sentence
and .modify each of the preceding clauses, and this brought. about the
anbigiilty.
So, the records of Aho constitutional convention, it, seeIs clear,
vitiate the argumenitthat thopresidential office devolves oil thoeVice
President, who thereby becomes President for the renininder of the
term. But, regardless of tl- intent, of the framers of the Constitution,
remember that Seven Vice Presidents have, upontile dtinath of the
President, been recognized as having become- tOdo jure President.
and, as a resultof these precedents established whenever a President
has died, it scenes to be assumed without question that the Vice
President would become President and does not merely act. as such
when the Presidlent dies.
I believe that was Daniel Wesmter's view at the time of President
larrjson's -(eatji-ii other words,- that Vico- President Johili Tyler
actually bcuin6Preaident. Phis, of courso--this precedent' it), h case
of tie (lcath of the President-is what makes it easier to argue that a
Vice Preidenti supqrse(les the PIesident whnioVer lie exercises the
Prcsidentfl power, whether ii hdblIty or ottprwiso.
T110 CIAIIIMAN. May I addalttlo b't of historythore, too, to that
idea and go lirtlier. When bills ware sot to 'l'kr, they were noted
a$ bills sent to lio Acting President and, very ang'ily wo are told
ho struck out the Word "Acting" nd tilsited upon his Ibefg eonsideeod
a. President, 4nd tlit word "Aclig"p vas stricken outi quito a' numberof imes oil the signiig'of it hiinbr f bills.
Mr. DihowNEM. WJIoQwho struck tlt out wit It his. pen, lie caused
a lag'prt offi "'blofi )vo ar6 discussing His morilng.
As We will noo 'both intlOOarnflol and ti i6Wilsl'i Cases, the Vice
President> was not asked t6 Id a Presideht largely beauso of'ftho
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fear ihat lie wouldhbecome President and would thereby oust. for tle
remainder of tile term (ho incapacitated incumbent,. As a result, the
full extent, of (lie disability was (arefilly guarded in both of these
cases because of pelisopal loyalty to the (isahled IPresidont--and,
more imlportalit', the public ilierest, couhl not help suffering from hav-
ing ntvoactive President hi both of these cases.
i would remind you President. (larflehl lhigered on for 80 days
after he was shot on July 2, and during this period lie plfiorniMe(
only one official act-the signing of an ex~raditloif-papor. Although
his mind Was clear during thefirst. days of his ivolidistn, lie was 1iincoil-
scious nit(d it was reported that. lie sit'rerkt from ifilhlcinal l11 dlling
tho last days of Ins illness and hIe was physically unable to (llahirge
the dlties of his oflice6 -(hlrg , substantia part. of that 80-dny period.
I don't thilk it. could seriously h1 contend ed there was no importaiit
busiem during tOha, time because history shows that officers were
unlable to perforlitheir dities because the Presidlent was uinaible to
commission them, and at that, tiue Ihre'o was a serious crisis in our
foreign aftairs. Yet, (lie department heads transacted only such
rotline business as could be transacted without (h0 Presidelnt's supcr-
Vision, And it, was claimed that ipoll'ta, questions of Ib1ile policy
which could be decided only by (he President Were sinlply igiiored.
Another important, factor here is that public opinion was sharply
divided about the manner in which the public business was being
handled-fa ratherserious ing fora time of crisis.
Mr. K.:A'rTo. That. is trIi0 today, too.
Mr. BRowN:LL,. I imagine tlat 'is right, ('ongressman.
'T'le ('1AINSIAN. It )Oints U), too, ill view of the tillies in which we
live, the need for cerfa61 action to cover (lite situation today.
Mr. Browi:L1.. Yes. 'hat is-..-
T1he (J!AiIMAN. During the time of Oarfleld we had that lifiltilty
us yotlpointed out., andt our records show event more (Iiflililties, whiich
aro all tle more reason for action, iow---
Mr. BuowN.:Jt,. I agree withtiat,, lmr. chairman .
'Pl(nie (AlWAN. And that we should nbt. wait to have a coisstitu-
tional amendment adopted. , , 
Mr. BlIowNi'1m,. That was the point. I was trying to iake to Coli-
gre.sman Keating, of course. ,While it. is true public opilioli is always
divided about howv public btsiss is transacted, in timile of need Wnd
national crisis it is Iniportait. to minimize that. to tho extent we can
(1o so; and I believe we can do so by settling this problem tiow.
Mr. KCHLATINo. In furtherance of what. the (Chatrialn has said-I
feel strongly on this: That, while I have felt. a Iqow was sufficient. arid
a constitutional atineUeI11111. was not ilicessary, if I become convincled
to the contrary, that. tie constitutioial, aineudmiit. is neiee atT, I
don' think that this conuUtte should simply pass a law, if the JlIdg-
ilnont of (tio committee is that onstitutional a lneue is necessaryjust Iecauso of speed. I think that, is a secondary consileration, and
1 hik-
Mr. Ifitow:m. I am glad to hear you say that, aid I 1opp 61- ...
N4r. I:ATINo. WO should put tle eniphlAis upon doig the ihligrihit, at (is lto...
'lltoa ChiRiAN. 1 tlnik (lie reason why we vould have to have a
constitutionall 111elln1t, if at pit is because of the suggestions that
have. beon mado'concerning inability of cotllissions or (te Cabinet
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O&' some such similar group to be constituted to ra~se the question of
inability aihd to solve that situation.
Tlere is an express admonition in the Conititufotl that inithe event.
of the inability of the President the duties shall devolve upon the
Vice'President. 'He must take-over. He has no choice in the matter.
Therefore, there can be no interposition of any kind of agency or
group or commission wfich would have the discretionar power tosa., whether-ho can or cannot take over because this is a sohd, straight,
miinhibited cominntid to the Vice President to take over, and tIere
chn be no othdO agency.
So, if you are going to have any commission or any group determine
that,, you must have a constitutional amndment.
M point of view is: We don't need the constiftitiftil amendmndeit
because we don't need the commission. I think'the Congress has
Ample reserve powersby article I, section 8, which gives the Congress
power to- make all necessary and proper laws for carrying into execu-
tion all the powers under tie Constitution. I think iler that. power
Congress can act,, and for that reason and for the other reasons Ihave
indicated I thiik a sim ple law is fill that is necessary.
XMr. KEATIUX. Mr. Chairman, my point is this: I know that you
advocate allowing the Vice President to say when the President is
disabled and to take over, and I have respect, for your viewpoint, in
thiat'regarl and-I woild-much rather acceputhat, than nothing at. all,
but the main thing is to do something, in my judgment. Tie method
is a secondary matter.
I have felt a commission was the best method. The President and
Attbrnev General have advocated members of the Cabinet. I do not
necessarly agree.
I think it was Professor Corwin of Princeton who said: "If anyone
intervenes, there must be a constitutional amendment."
I lean with yout that any of these methods can be done by law, but
my point is ths: Whatev;r method we select as best, whether that is
to be done by law or constitutional amendment, should not be a
cofitroling factor, It should be a very minor factor.
If we decide to interpose the Cabinet as the best or have a com-
mission as the best method, and that requires a constitutional amend-
ment, we should not b6 deterred in that by the. fact it is going to take
2 or 3*or 4 years to get, it through.
Mr. BRoWNULL. I agree. -
Mr. KEA1r!NO. We should not lean toward a method which favors
law over a constitutional amendment, unless we feel that is the bestethod,
Now; I am very much open-minded on the approach to the method.
I, aturlly, like the authorof anything, think" tlihr, tny own suggestion
mnlht have more merit than someone else's, but I am very ready to
field on that to the necessity of action, and in thit, action we must
eid this question not upon any specific situation, but with completeobjectivity.Mr. Bw .LL.. I agree with that.
Mr.'WAMrER. Did t he Attorney General, by an-v chance, see the
committee report, which this subcoinmittee issues on the 26th of
March eodtaningin annlysis'bf the replies to the questionnaire which
WOas'sent tothe auth6itli in this field?
Mr. Brtow4ELL. I saw last year's report. I haven't seen this.
I
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Mr. WAurER. This is new, af I respectfully suggest that you
examine B on page 03. You will find many of the authorities, includ-
ing Professor Corwin, as Mr. Keating just mentioned, agreeing that,
legislation could meet this problem. .
Mr. BROWNELL. Well Congressman, in a moment, I am going to
devote myself exclusIV-dy to that discussion, as to what. method we
should apply here, whether constitutional amendment or statute, and
I have what I hope are soine rather appealing arguments so far as we
lawyers are concerned as to why we- think the constitutional method
is needed; but I think before we get Into that, if Imay, I would like to
spend just a very few more minutes on stressing theo-ned for action
because, as we know, some people have taken the position that there
is no need for action. They have taken the position: "Oh, we have
struggled and got by in crises for 105 years. Why do anythingabout, It'?"
I think, in order to realize the importance of this question, it is
necessary for me to spend just a few more minutes in describing these
historical incidents so that there cai be no question in the mind of
any members of this subcommittee that action is needed, and thien we
we will come to the question of method.
Mr. KEATINO. We are living in a different world from 105 years ago.
Mr. BROWNELL. That is a fact.
The CHAiRMAN. May I just ask another question: I think you had
indicated you would look up the question of whether or not we haVe
ever had a situation where we offered a bill and a constitutional amend-
ment covered the same subject at the same time. Did you have a
chance to do that?
Mr. BROWNELL. Yes, and that is in my statement this morning.
The CHAIRMAN. You have?
Mr. BROWNELL. Yes.
To go on with the Garfield incident, you will remember after ,his
illness had dragged on for 60 days his physicians thought he would
recover, but his convalescence was expected to take another 60 days.
So, .the Cabinet considered the Vossibillty of asking Vice. President
Arthur to act as President during Garfield's recuperation. All 7Cabinet members agreed on 4the desirabiity of having him act as
President, but 4 of the 7 thought that Arthur s exercise of Presidential
power would actually make him President for the remainder of the-
term and thereby oust Garfield from office- and it wa6 reported that
the then Attorney General Wayne MaoVeagh shared these views.
So, the inevitable result, which always will happen, I believe;, under
the present'system, was that the Cabinet decided that"arfield should
not be advised to ask Arthur to act as President without first telling
him of the possibility. Therefore, the whole matter was deferred
because the physicians feared that the shock caused by such a dis-
cussion might result in the President's death. As, you Will recall,
President Garfield died on September 20th, making it unnecessaryto
solve the problem in 1881 and the whole matter was dropped until
President Wilson became iii in 191. 1 '
Mr. KEATING. Mr. Attorney General, you omitted in your state-
ment the mention of the New York Times and the New York Herald
Tribune and"the Boston Evening Transcript, and I notice represent
atives of those papers hero and I am sure you want that eluded
in your transcript.0a4--
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
Mr. BROWNELL. I do. I thank you for that,.
That was overlooked in answering sone of the questions.
Mr. McCuLLocin. Of course, I cannot lot this occasion pass without
reminding my goo -frind front Now York that, part of America lies
west of tio, Allhonies.
Mr. BnoWNELL. As a Cornlhusker, I will agree with you on that,
Congressman.
Now, in furtherance of this first, point that I Anm trying to take
here-that action Is necessary in this inat.ter-let's lake up the
President Wilson incident.
There can be no doubt, that President Vilgon was actually unable to
perform the duties of his office during at least, some of the p~erioI ofter
bis collapse which strtod on Soptember 25, 10 0, and did not ond litil
a year and a half later at the nd of his term on March 4, 1021.
As evidence of this inability, it appears that dluring tho special
session of the 60th Congress 28 acts became haw because of the
President's failure to act on thent within 1ho requisite 10 days. TIhe
record,hows he passed on only I of the 10 acts that were preellted
to him between October 28 and November 18.
The Senate Comittee on Foreign Relations repeatedly tried to
get the President to take some action or supply the conmmitteo with
some information about-the ShaimttwIg settlement, blit, the committee
request went unanswered.
These facts aroonly part, of the evidence that the President, was
disabled, in fact, during a part of this time and, more important, this
inability occurred when the Senate was debating the Versailles Treaty.
The exact degree of the inability is uncertain, but I think it is quite
clear he suffered from a stroke and his loft siode was paralyzed, and
there is very good ovidonceo that he was unconscious or at least only
semiconscious during a part of this illness.
Whatever Wilsons condition, Vice President Marshall and the
Cabinet were not fully advised concerning it, and the President's
family and his White House staff and the Cabinet discharged public
business in such manner and by such methods as they deemed appro-
priate.
History indicates for example, that Mrs. Wilson and Dr. Cary T.
Grayson, the President's physician, played an important part in the
solution of many questions of public policy.
Students of this period seen to agree that official papers were given
to Mrs. Wilson, who sometimes passed the papers on to the Secretary
of the Treasury or to someone else in whom sle had confidence.
Soon after Wilson's stroke the Cabinet Joined with the White House
staff to keep the Government operating. Secretary of State Lansing
called 21 Cabinet meetings to transact executive business; but, as a
matter of fact, these meetinp were said to have been held for nearly
4 months before Wilson even hoard of them.
Although Lansing's action doubtless had an effect on an congres-
sional move that mNght have been made to establish the President's
inability, you will remember that President Wilson accused Lansing,
of usurpmg Presidential power and forced him to resign.
One other footnote on the history of that time: Patrick Tuinulty
Wilson's secretary, reported that Secretary of State Lansing ha
suggested that, in view of the President's inability, they should ask
theVico President to act as President and he quotes himself as saying:
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Yoii inay rest assured that while .Woodrow Wilson Is lying In the White House
on tho broad of his back I will not be a party to ousting him.
'Tiun lky al.o reported that when Lansing resigned, Wilson said:
'i'umulty, It 14 never the wrong thne to spiko disloyalty. When Lansing sought
to oQust me, I was upon iny back, I am on my feet now and I will not have dis.
loyalty about mo.
Because of (Ili belief that the Vice President would actually become
President. for the balance of t.he term and the President, would- be
ousted, asking Marshall to act, as President during Wilson's inability
was viewed as disloyalty. The President's friends didn't seem to
think that Marshall would remain Vice Presidentand merely discharge
the Presidential functions during the inability. So the 'result was
what we would expect-that theylookd at. Marshall with antagonism
and viewed him as a possible usurper instead of viewing him as a
person who could lighten tho disabled president's burden; and, in-
stead of asking himi to exercise the powers devolved upon him by the
Constitution, they attemnpted to keep th6' Government operating in
their own way in order to forestall any serious attempts to declare the
President's inability.
Now it seenis to me a study of these two cases--the (larfield and
the Wilson cases -shows there'is a real need for a means of supplying
an active President during times of Presidential inability, and it is the
relief that (lie Vice 'resident actually becomes President, for the
balance of the terni when called upon as such which has nullified, for
practical effect, the conslitlitional provision for the administration of
government, when the President is lncapacitated.
'Th1e CHAIRMAN. I think on that we are all in accord, Mr. Attorney
General.
Mr. McCuv,.ocn. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the Attorney
General, if it, is his studied judgment, section 4 of his proposal will
nullify or neutralize all these feelings that. are so eloquently set out
here on the part, of Cabinet members and friends an appointees of
any President.
Mr. BIRowNEba. That is the principal purpose of it.; yes, sir.
Mr. McCuLOdn. 'Tliat is your studied judgment----
Mr. BRowNraz. Yes, sir.
iM. Mccummoo. That. the loyalty which is engendered by the con-
sideration given by a President. will Ihe completely neutralized by sec-
tion 4 of your proposal?
Mr. IBnoWNIL.L. Taken in combination with ihe other sections, yes,sir.
It is thIs problonll.of providing for the exercise of Presidential power
during periods of inability which would not be solved merely by pro-
viding a means by which the inability could 4e established, for nless
the Presidmt and his Cabinet and his other friends and tie public,
I might add, are absolutely certain of the President's status after the.
termination of the inabilitv, they will tend to oppose any attempt to
declare the existence of tle inability, because they would view that
as a declaration which was equivalent to removing the President from
office.
To answer Congressman MeCulloph's question specifically this
problem, We believe, would be solved by sections 2, 3, and 4 f Ires-
dent Eisenhower's suggestion, which provide that the Presidential
powers and duties shallbe, discharged by the Vice President as Acting
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President and that the Vice President shall discharge the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President, and the President could come
back under section 4.
So, with this history to guide us and with the realization of new
hazards, the continuity of governmentt duo to the atomic ago, we must
concludo-and I am delight.ed to hear the chairman say so, and I
believe it must he the unanimous opinion of any. lawyers who have
studied this problen-that action is needed to solve this problem of
Presidential inability.
Now it seems appropriate to turn to tho hnportant question of
whether this can best be done by a constitutional amendment or by a
statute.
There is no doubt that some students of the problem have argued
that a statute or concurrent resolution which declares that the ice
President merely acts as President ad interim would be sufficient, but.
there is sharp division of opinion on the question as to whether such a
statute would be constitutional.
What I am endeavoring to point out to you in this section of my
argument is this: That we are not endeavoring to say who has the
better of the argument; we are trying to eliminate the argument before
it arises.
Now, to understand the basis for this division of opinion which
arises-and it is a very serious ono-I want to call attention to the
different phraseology in th6 present Constitution of the first half and
the second hal f 61 paragraph 0 of section 1 of article Ii, which we have
quoted previously. This is the way the first half reads:
In dse of the removal of the President from office or of his death, resignation,
or inability to discharge the powers and duties of tue said office, the same shall
devolve on the Vice President.
Now, there is no express reference to any action by Congress.
Let's look at the second half. The second half reads this way:
* *- * and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
offieershall then act as President and such officer shall act accordingly, until thedisability be removed, or a Preslient shall be elected.
Note, as I say, that in that second half it is specified that Congress
may act-and that, I think, is the basis for these arguments that are
being made.
I don't ask you to agree with it or disagreO With it, but I do want
t6 show you that sincere students of the Constitution have disagreed
as to this and I don't think we can stand for that kind of disagreement
in time'of erlis when we have a chance, as we do now, to eliminate
that Alimient before the crisis arises.
The U AIRMAN. It shows also, in the first instance, what action is
limited, t Athe Vice President and, in the second, limited to theCong ross. . .
1There is the clear indication i my mind that it was the Vice
President who was to raise the question and the Vice President was to
reolV6e the question.SFrankly, if Mr. Arthur and Mr. Metrshall had taken action in those
d#§, 6n question would have arisen today. They could have easily
satdiunder the first part. of that sctil;i 1, article'i, that they had the
pover "to raise the question; theyhad the power to assume the duties,
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and they did, and they were going to assume the duties. They would
have been imminently sustained in that, argument..
Mr. BROWNELI. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, but the point I
am trying to make is, while you and I may think one way, there .tre
very eminent people, whom "I will cite here in a moment, who think
the other way, aM as long as you have that stalemate and opinion
you are not going to get any Vice President to take over; you are not
going to get any Attorney Oeneral to advise the President that he
should tt'fii over the powers.
The CIIAIAMAX. Oh, I agree with you on that.
Mr. BIuOWF.LL. You are going to have critical conflict in public
opinion at the time, and why should we, risk that when we can now
settle the matter before the crisis arises?
The CtAIRSIAN. I couldn't agree with you more. History shows
there was a reluctance on the part of Marshall and ArthurtO take over.
They were not usurpers. They were fearful that they might be called
usur1p ers.
XMr. BRoWNIELJ. That is what I meant to imply.
The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, it is not the danger of the usurpation of
power. It is the danger
Mr. BibWNELL. They won't act.
The CHAIRMA.. They won't use the power that the Constitution
gives them.
If you agree with me that they had the right, to do exactly what I
indicated in those cases without a constitutional amendment, why do
we need the constitutional amendment now?
Mr. BROWNELL. Because of the precedent that has been established
in the long history and the 6ig history that has flowed from it.
The CHAIRMAN. We can show, with the proper leadership and
proper guidance of public opinion, that those actions, those precedents
were wrong.
Those precedents doi't necessarily bind us or bind the future Vice
President who believe that Arthur and Marshall Were wrong; but
surely, if you admit they had the power to do that in those cases, in
1881 and 1919, they have a right to do it now without a constitutional
amendment.
Mr. BROWNELL. Le me go on with my argument, if I may, Mr.
Chairman, because I think -I can show you there is very respectable
Argument the other way. I may not agree with it, but as long as that
conflict exists I am sure you will not get the action you need in time
of crisis" because nobody wants to take a chance on it; and the question
of settling that problem as we lawyers know, cannot be settled, can-
not even be 6(Arted, until the crisis arises, so that you have that period
of uncertainty there which is so unfortunate.
Tho CHAIRMAN. Wouldn'tthat reluctance that'you agreed with me
was present be dissipated If Congress would simply make the declara-
tioli that the Vice President shall in the case of the disability. as a
result-of the question which he raised and resolved, step in and take
over th0 duties?
Mt, BROWNELI. Not as I see it, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The fact thft dongess so stated would be encour-
agemient for him to come to that c64ncgusion.
.1 a1in sure public opinion would dektrmine if he was wrong. There
is always the power of impeachment in case he was wrong.
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If he was intemperato and was not taking proper action-ho would
be very careful; I am sure ho would-impeaclnent would curb any
kind ofi excess, any kind of usurpation.
I think this resolution would ie sufficient to do away with a roluc-
tanco to assume the power.
Mr. BRoN ,,vEij. I think your first. point po'rhaps is right. It, might
give some encouragementt, but it wouldn't settle the problem because
we are not dealing with a question of statutory intprpretation. Even
if the statute is passed, you still have te questoll of its constitu-
tionality anid thb same arguments would be made to that, point as are
being miade now; and that is thoreason nobody waits to make {Clie
move. Thoy would stir ip a |ot ofltlgation right at the tie of crisis.
Now, if w'e can settle this thlng once and for all, by clear language
in the Constitttlon, itself, 1tenwo will have surely solved th me Probliem.
Mr. WAt, ER. I would be inclined to'aIr'eo wit you, Mr. Brownell.
Mr. BROwNEiLL. I would like to lprocei with a case where tie ques-
tion of the validity of the statute would be raised.
Mr. WALTER. Who would raise that, question?
Mr. BRowNEIL,. I have several citations of flint, as we go along here.
Would you prefer to wait until it, comes in thoprepared statelent?
Mr. WALTER. I agree with y7ou. Unless we cold visualize tlat, we
shouldn't worry too much about it.; hNt I foresee cases where It would
arise.
Mr. BRowNEL,,. Now, let ine give you the argument of thie people
on the side of the argument that" (ie Aice President becomes President
for the balance of the terni,
A few weeks after Oarficld's death a man namtd4 Charles WV. Jones,
of Florida, asserted in the 47th Congress that inability has the same
effect as death , resignation, or removal. In all foir cases he argued thme
office devolves on th Vice President, who thereby becomes President.,
and he argued that. if Garfeld had lived and Artlur hiid been forced
to exercise Presidential power during-the President's recuperatiou,
Arthur would have displaced Oakrfleld and would have served for the
remainder of the term because, ho said, once a Vice President is seatol
in the Presidential chair hme has all timopower that. is given to the Presi-
dent by the Constitution and he cammot be displaced except by im-
peachment for high crimes and misdemeanors. , t
Senator Jones beliov'ed, in otler words, that a constitunal amend-
inent would be necessary if a Vice President were to servo only, for the
duration of the Prosident's Inability and, as tihe Consltuon now
stands, hne argued, the Vtc. Presidentmet.serve for tho remainder of
the term; and lie offered three arguments in support of his position:
Firet, sino. the Constitution inakes no distinction between a
vacancy and inability, a Vice Presidefit would become President
in case of inability, 'just. as ho would in case of the President's
death;
Second, lie a uod that the vesting clause of article 1I excludes
the posi billtyo ,ha-i"two Presidents at once-one acting and
tie other disabled; a6d
Third, lie argued that the clause "until the disability, be re.
moved" limta only the temire bf an officer other than th6 Posi-
dent or the Vico Prsi(dent. w%'lmo acts, as Presidot by statutory
designation, but It 'doesn't. linit the'tonUre-6f the Vice President..
1t me cite you another oxamplo of an arument fJom a sound
authority in.favor of the position that., as the Constttion" now
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stands, the Vice President could tot. act. merely for the dinirtilon of
tile inability, but. would become Presidetit for (he remainder of the
term.
During Gartiold's illiiesq former Judge Abram J. )i ellnhooffer said:
I start with hi4 voielisiou: 'i'lat whenever the Vice Pre.ldent gets lawfully
into the Presideney the President get4 Infiully out of it. There cannot lie two
lawful lPresIdents at themme time. Mark, no limit to lho for which these powers
md duties "shall devolve" Is fixed. It is just as nihsolute aid Iimitles, as if the
langtlage of the Con1stittion| wer:
"In case of the removAl of lthe President fromn ollice, or of his death or resignation
or Inability to diseharge the powers and duties of sAid oliitce, ihe Vice President
shall b)eWOIUe PreshelOt."
And when the Pres.Ident gets lawfully out thre is no way Mii which he can get it
again.
''his line of arguillelt wlic l)itteihod'ier used to subsilantiate thig
(Olnlusion wimisuch tho same as thlit used by Senator Jolles.
Anotler resfeed authority, Theodore W. Dwighl, profesor of
con-liuationA law at Columbia, took tie same position.
At. (ho timie President Wilson went over to the VeNsailles Conferenco,
inllis Taylor, who was aolther resieied conslitutional lawyer,
argued tiis way:
And here the fact should b, emphasized that tneither the Conslitutio nor the
Presidential Succssion Act. makes o11 Iprovdilon for a Prcsident of the United
States pro telnpore. After the Vice P'reshlent hlms beett sworn in as President,
he becomes sech In the full sense of the term. No iurovlsiou is made by law
uider which he can hnuid back the presidential office to hl. predecessor.
Now, 1 (don't hn p0,1 to agree with this line of argumentthiat is
offered by Mesmia. Jones, Dittenhoeffer, Dwight, Taylor, and numbers
of others. Although I think their arguments can be answered very
effectively, I don't go into the merits of their arguments at this tine
because I want to make this point: That a number of respected con-
stitutional authorities have argued that there can be no temporary
devolution of presidential power on the Vice President during periods
of presidential inability; and, whatever we may think of their argui-
ments, I think that. a statute would not protect the Nation ade-
quately, for the doubts that have been raised have been raised too
persistently.
As long as there is dolbt lingering doubt, concerning the constitu-
tiofinality of the statute, as long as there is a question concerning the
disable President's constitutional status after his recovery, I do not
believe any in"abilty, as a practical matter, however severe it may be
wofild b're ognized lest tihe recognition of that disability ould
oust the (isabfed President from office. Moreover, a presidential
disability, severe and prolonged enough to warrant the devolution of
presidential power on the Vice Presia ent, would create something of
a crisis itself, .
Sol the Onstitution should be clear and there sliould he no room
for disputo"6bout its meaning, for that is the very time When the coiui-
try should be ilted and the very time when a Vice President should
have general support.
IVQ must remember that the constiutitonality of such a statute just
couldn't be tested until tdie inability arose, and it is the very Uncer-
tainty and confuson at that tinme that we' are trying to avoid. That
is another"reason why a constitutional amedinet is preferable to a
statute, oven if we iilt it., as the chairman suggests, to merely a
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declarationihat he Vice President is to be Acting President and only
during the period of inability.
Now, what if we go further than that,, if it is-proposed to go further,
ad declare that, some person or soino group o persons or a commis-
sion, other thaI the Vice Prcsident, should participate with hin in
tile solution. of this question or decision as to when the Vice President
becomes Acting President?
For example, would we need a constltUtlonial aenondment, if my
proposal is adopted, which wou ld provide that when tle President. is
disabled and faiNs to declare his inability, tle Vice Prosident 'Iltis a
Majoi'ityv of t.he Cabinet should declare the existoce of the inahillty?
I agree with the chairman. I don't think this section could colt-
stitutionally be embodied ri a mere statute or concurrent resolution,
nor could any, plan that. involves the creation of an inability com-
mission or an, plai that involves the'determlintion ofinability by, the
courts. Thoso would certainly y have to be done by consttfiliional
amendment, and I think it, is inmportant to go to history for a little
instruction on- thispoinit,..
At. the time of President Oarleld's illness i 1881 the great. weight
of opinion favored thoiierrtation that Vieerdhnt -Arthur, and
lie alone, could determine that the President. was disabled. . At. that
time most students of tho7Constitution said that the Vice President
was obligated to exercise the powers of the Presidency during Gar-
field's illness, just, as much as he was obligated to preside over the
Senate or perform any other constitutional duty, slid that no enabling
action bv the courts or the Congress or the Cabinet was necessary.
Since the Vice President had ihe dutv of acting as President, it was
argued, imf-cortain contingencies, his ofticial discretion extends to the
determination of whether such a contingency Acttually exists. In
other words, thiey Were applying the Well-known rule o f lav that in
contingent grants of power the oneAb whom the power is grated is to
d~eide when the emergency has arisen.
The CAIIIMAx. Don't you agree with that statement.?
Mr. BRoWNELL. I do.
The CHJAUTMAN. If that is the case, and the Conititution vests
that power in the Vice President, he is the one to whom the power is
granted, and, therefore, the Vice President must decide wien the
contingency arises.
Mr. BR0WNELL. That is right; but I think it shouldn't depend on
one man's onion, even if ieo has a title back 61 his name. I think
there should be a constitutional provision which would make it so
clear that we couldn't have this kind of debate.
Mr. KEATING. Yes; but it also seems to m-,I say this with the
the utmost respect-that the chairman is getting' the cart before the
horse, because it seems to me our committees dtty Is first to determine
the iethod by which we think this disability should be detorm ined
then to decide based upon that, '-whether a law or constitutional
amendment is thedesirable approach.
Now, there probably is merit to the argument--just leave It to the
Vice Piesident, which is more likelY6 give warrant to a law as against
a consttutional amendment-bu ' don't think that should be an
argument in that respect. I think We should first determine how we
are going to do it-whether we are go ng to adoptthis plan or some
other pan-and then determine ,Whether it should be by law or
constitutional. amendment.
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Tie C(IArIRMAN. I agree with you. I think we want. to determine,
fir st, whether it should be by law or constititional amendment.
I lave cofne to the cotiduslon, after a short. dehbrioration, there is
sonie law ahl( )recedence, after reading all tile history, thit all thit is
necessary is for the Vice Pes(leitr to let.
Thisi ,very stateelint lht tie Attorney Genieral reaIn:
It i a wcill-estal1lih,( ruile of law thint it contingent graiit-; of power the one
to wholti the power Is graned N to derlde when the emergency has arisen-
leads lie to the inevitable conclusion that, since tile grant of power
is to tlie Vice President, lie (eterlines the colmtingency upon which he
exercises the power.
Mr. McCuLL'ouli. M,. Chairman, if I would follow that conclusion
one stop ftrlier, could I say that, il your opinion, there is no need for
auythilig-th authority now exists, and it. is only the problem of
having the Vice President act, when lie should?
The OnAMMAN. LegallV, you are absolutely correct; but there are
those doubts in the cases tfiat we have ha(d illustrated, the cases of
Marshall-and Aiethurh, to assume that, power. Therefore, it is necessar%
to do away with that dolubt anid resort to congressional enactment
which would remove the hesitflancv.
Mr. MCCULLOCII. Do you thiik 'die congressional enactment, of
itself, would have .much influence on lthe Vice President acting?
Tite CHAIRMAN. I think it. would.
Mr. BROWNELL. That is where I disagree with the Chairman,
because I think it, is a constitutional problem rather than a statutory
problem.
The disagreement here is the interpretation'of the Constitution land,
while you feel one way,-I happeii to feel tie same way on it-suppose
t.ho whole committee or the whole Congress should feel hfe same way-
still it. is a question of intepreting the Constitution, and there is Very
respected authorityv on'the other side, and I believe it is that very
disagreement which has caused the Vice President to hesitate'to act,
andi that is wvhy I favor-
Mr. WALTEi. Is it. disagreement asmuch as it is doubt?
Mr. BRoWrNELL,. Doubt. I think that is more accurate. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRIMAN. Read tIle next sentence, and I think 'that nails it
d1own.
Xr, ,. BROWNL,. I believe-and this is a personal opinion-that the
C(nftl,ijtiion now vests the power--
The CHAIRMAN. Read the one before that. Yoti didn't read it.
Mr. BROWNE.LL. All right. As tile Congtittion now stands
TheoCHAIRMAN. -No. "Thus the Vice Preside'it is constituted"
Mr. BROWNELL. Oh, yes. I have it, now. I lost my place there
for a minute.
Thus the Vice President is constituted the judge of the President's
inabilitv.
As tie COnstitiitioit nlow stands, it. menftions only the successor,
and thus makes hin the judge of thie facts.
I believe the Constittition now vests the power of determining
inability ln the Vice President and that the Vice President could not
eonstltutonally be divested of this'power without a constitutional
amendment.
That is the argument on ty side only.
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
I would point out hero-what I would like to do now is to shows-
that if the President's I)lall, whieh involves 1)oth tile Vice President
and the Cabinet larticipating in this decision, shoul( be adopted, a
Constitutional ilnlen(lueet. would hae to be p',eel.
I call lo your attention the faet, thatl, th1 a O)illet. lhi always iotifie, d
lhe Vice President. when a President. has died. I fluink it, should also
,iotify him in an analogous sitluation of thf president's Iabilit,; lt
at the present, time that, is only custom that, requlies the C1alint. to
notify the Vice President. Ill ease of the President's deatl, and tlhe
iotification Adds nothing to the Vice lPresi(denlt's eing jower.. In
other words, le succession clause, as it now stlds is se If-executing,
nd the Presideiitial poWeis devolve on the Vice President without
(his not iticatioi IIIder the Constitution1.
I think, as a pralical matter, that a Vice President wolll not
undertake the exercise of Presidentlal power during the perio(l of
Presidential inability without first CoIy'idth r the Cabinet; but.,
under the Constitulion, as I say, as it, is now, ie coul tlo so.
Section 3 of the proposal I am making this morning would make it
manlatory for the Vice President to Consult the Cabinet --a(ld to
secure the approval of a Majority of tIat body. III this sense our
proposal limits the authority wlieh the Constiiitut ion now vests in
the Vice President, aid that is the reason I think it is qite clear, nnd
I believe we would mil'agree that a consltitlitioll animel(ZI memit would be
necessary to cariryv it. into effect.
Mr. KI.ATIro.' Mr. Attorney General, before yoil proceed to No. 3,
would voit please turn back to your wording of the present Consti-
tulion, on page 4 of your statement?
Mr. BRowE LL. Yes.
Mr. KEATIxo. There is a reference to what Congress nay by law
provide for-
Mr. BitowsmLL. Yes.
Mr. KEATINo. And it stays:
* * * the Congres may by- law provide for the case of removal, I death,
resignation or Inabilitv, botli of the P1reAdent and Vice 'resident, declaring what
officer shall then act-
and so on.
Is it, your interpretation of that conistittloiii provision lhat the
etenx t to which Congress may by law provide for the inability has
relation only to declaring who shall act. in the line of successioni and
goes 10 further than that?
Mr. BowNPu,. That is correct.
Mr. KEAr No. SO that even though it says Congress may by law
provide for the inability
Mr. Brow%,F.Ll,. That is when 1)oth the Vice President and the
President are out.
Mr. KEATIXO. Oh, I see. That applies only in tho ease where they
are both out?
Mr. BROWxILLh. That, is corrvet.
Mr. KEATIX-o. All right.
Would you also, beforevoi proceeit to tho advocacy of your speefic
proposal, "comment at this t neik 0tthe suggestion mndo that (lie
Congress proceed not by a law, but, by a constitutional amendment?
Mr. Bnow-NELL. I would be glad to comment on that now because
it, seems to me the more you consider the situation the more you
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realize it is a constitutional debate that. is involved hero find that ,tho
statute would not settle the constitutiolinnl dlebtl.
iho aiilhorities that we have discussed here this morning, very
respeethble oil both sides, nrv talking about the interlrctation of the
resultt Constit utin, fln tli qncstiOn Would merely be-ul)pose the
statute were pagsed-whehieI the statute is constittionfli lider thtI.
same provision in the ConstitlUtion. So, you (o not, eliminate the
debate by passing the statute. You still hiive this conflict of opinion,
fnd the conflict of Opinion, I think history shows u1s1 is whal has
made tho Vieo President, so hesitant to act, to the point where fhil
Vice President just. 1ins not noted oven thoul h yoll had a seriolls criss
of a year 111l ft half, as in the case of Preemiti-oni Wilson's illness.
M'. I{i:ATIN-. Counsel of our committee has calle'l my attention
to thhi teresting fact that in the first, 21 amendments to the Constitu-
tion they become effective in from I to 4 years. 'he 22d took 4 years.
'Th fi-t 21 took less than 4 years.
I think you have made a very convincing argument for a constitu-
tional amendilhnent.
-Mr. WAIN,.Irt. Actually, the average time is something less than
: years. You have to remember the --first 10 Amentnwts- were
adopted at, 1 time, but: the average time is something less than 3 years.
Mr.I itowNELL. It would seem now, if it is agreeable with you ,
Mr. Chairman, we might, discuss first why action is needed-I t hink
we fire in general agreement on thlat-and then discuss secondly why
the constitutional amendment seems to be. preferable to the statute,
and I bpieve-1 hope I am not overstating it when I say-there is
general agreement on that; but let us get to the specific provisions of
the planvwhich I would likd to have you consider, and I speak here on
behalf ofPresident Eisenhower, who has endorsed this plan and asked
the Congress to give it early and favorable consideration.
Section I of this plan merely confirms the present generally accepted
interpretation of the Constitution-that in case of removal of the
President from office, or is death or resignation, the Vice President
shall become President for the unexpired portion of the lhen current
term.
In other words this specifically affirms the result that has been
accepted by the Nation at least seven times in cases where the Presi-
dent has died. There is no controversy about that.
It seems wise to have it specifically stated in the Constitution rather
than a matter of usage.
Now we conie to tho questions of Presidential inability. There are
two kinds, you will remember, we are asking the subcommittee to
consider.
Section 2 states that if a Presidnt voluntarily declares in writing
that he Is unable to discharge the powers and duiies of his office, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting
President.
This section autthorizes tie President to announce his own inability
and allows him to do so, knowing that his powers and duties would
be restored to him when lie recovers.
The provision is also made that this announcement shall be in
writing for the obvious reason you don't want to have any dispute
fla to ifiether or not he (lid it., andf the existence of a written (locutnent
would serve that purpose.
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Tl'he CliiliM . Suppose lie were a prisoner of war, oult. of lit,
'ollntry, an li he wouldil't bo able to write'?
Mr.- foI,%Iio tl,. Then I think he would have to coino under
section 3; hut I t ihtik it. is i nOrlali in our thinking to ronieinllt wrthatl limOst iOse$ w~'oid uhllouib o dll"' l0 S 'olved linder this -t4clion '2.
For eximliple, where tho lPixsidellt, i lie is going into 010 vio plhl 1iid
knows he is, going to hi out. in a fe(lN days, could mako- this writ-ten
statement, thlt would tikeeiro of it, alnd lie would know whon his
VOlhvlloswei'O wits Comilete lie cohtilOnie back il10 oflho, aiint lint
wouhl givo assurricenol ofilv to Iili, bot, to1hi public.
It would be at 0181y, sellsi)h' way of dealingg wilh Ithis prolemllli.
,Mr. Foiw Mr. Attorney (ene'l 1, what wold he elie dlositolI
for thuit. statemnien?
Ni,, IliIow, r.i,, I lissulle uiiter lIhe exiting lnacticepit. would be
lie Offiho of the ,e'etll'y of Stalto, where aill suchi offit-Ihl ldouiiielits
nre Iiled.
As a mliattoi of fiet., the oily objection I have heard to ti. s action
No. 2 is t kat, it might. open fli' door to a President shrking his duies
and i 1)Olisibilitits; but. I lhik lte obvious answer to lhat. is anV
President. who used this section to shirk his duties would le lle baking
hi oath of office.
Mi'. ICCUOVILOt. Anid, of course, tnt. action would lie cOn'trariy to
all history.
Mr. lIowN, Eiu,. All history. h'lipro is not. (te slightest, bit of
evidence that woiihl happell.
So I think we could pa!.over that. rather captious objection and
come. now to section 3, whieh is designed at least. to take eare of tIle
niost. nUlUSuall sittt ioni which niiht.it, hia_pen, anid because it iiglt
!lppon, should be, 4lepalh with. -I his is thevose where the Presilentis unibloe or unwilling to declare his own inability.
In other words, this is the section that wouldhbo applicable ii ease
the President. wero unconscious or, ill lio t ase of the point raised by
the chairman - litn. ago, cahptured by lhe enemy in tite of war,
something of that. sort.
You can't deseri e all the various Oveits that might, constitute
inabilit.y, but, ill these cases that w0 are talking abott, the plaln calls
for the Vice President, with the approval of a majority of the Presi-(dent's (Cabinlet, to nmake the decision.SeBefore considering this provision, I tliik, however, we should look
at-sone of the alternatives that, live beenl proposed.
Thilt CHAIRMAN. Mr. Attorney Oeniral, I think you nre very wise
in refraining from defining inabilityy."
Mr. Bitow .II 'rhank you, sir.
I think a close study of tho question would Iniike it quite clear in
a Constitution we sholdiln't, g") Into that, inueh detail.
Mr, WALT9Ii. I think ie word is delhied so well In all the courts
tiat, it, would serve to m1eet ally Sit u Ation,
Mr. IioWN:LL. Yes: I agre with Ihlit, Congressmnai,
Mr. KIi:.lN. It is not a matter' of law.
Mr. Buow,:l,1 ,. That is riglt..IetA's turn to a lplannl ha tilliivtlv6, ourts, ihis alternleati\'e
ptro posal, which wt reject, arose durin Oarfilohs illiess. Theodore
Dwiglht At that title Said that. tiePresidenlial inAllity wAs iftjudieial
question, and, therefore, should be detertnlied in the courts.
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Now, in* the past thea theory of justiciability, if you choose to call it
that., hais founild support among some Mei6bers of Congress,
For exali)lo, oit several occasions hills have becn Introdiced to give
the Nilreine Court. original jurisdletioi to determine the President's
inabilylt.v; Iut# of course, we start, with the proposition that a cousti-
tuti6na aliindmit would he necessary if this tv pe of solution were
to be adopted for these reasons, which I man sure wi[! he clearly e vident
lo the members of this committee:
First, tohe Supreme Court. has already ruled that its originaljutrimdiclinl is lmiite(d to that set forth'in the Colstitution and
cannot be enlarged by statute;
Second, nto htlderAl coirt. can inqmnro, oil its own motion,
into tlie action of the le.Oh4lative or executive branches; and
Thir'd, it Is (llilitful' t-lit. the courts could be given statutory
nutho'iti; tofind a Presidont. -disabled in ani action for inandalius,
diircct.ilng the Vice President. to act, as President, because the
discretionary authority is involved.
Mr. FoiLY. Mr. Attorn. 6 (neral, at, thatlpoint, are you acquaintied
with the recommendation of Professor Crosskey?
Mr. BIOWN.h,. Yes.
Mr. Fohrmv. Where lie suggested perhaps yol or your office might
initiate quo wari-aflto proceedings?Mr. BfowNEJJJJ. I used to have a good many -arguments with
Professor Crosskev when he and I were members of the Yale Law
Roviow together, and I thilk I would colninue that. argument Oil
this subject. if I saw him again.
Now, then, to say that the courts (1o not -now have equity juris-
(ietltoll to pass on 4 Presidoit's alleged inability does not mea08n that
the court.44iight not pass on this quest ion, and here now we come to
Congressman Walter's inquiry. Once the Vice President, has exer-
cised Presidenti al power, it, is' possible, I think, that the issue might.
be properly raised in a case involving individual ri ghts.,
For example, ote who is prosecuted 'under- a law signed bIy an
Actlig Piesideit might. question (he validity of lie law on the ground
that. the President was not atualhv disablld and that. the purported
law, therefore, was hl)roperly signed.
To give youi another explpe, a litigant might attack the legality
of an mx-eutlve actlio6, alleging thai tie Presidhent was hicalpacitated
at. the time lie took the action.
in such cases, it i.4 concelvablo that the courts might, decide ti
(piestion of:, whether or not a President, is disabled.
I am in cined to think that., as the Constitution now stands, the
courts would (lehcle the Constitution submits this question to the
Vice President's judgueont, alone, and that they were houid by his
decision.
There vould also Ile the question of whether tile courts would look
beyond the prosumptlit of regularity of official action.
If this proposal subiiltted by me tlis m1 orniihnlg were, adopted, I
believe tho courts would Atec pt the flidt lhgoftie Vice Iresident., and
a major, y of the Cabilet, as final; ievwrtheless# I do think these
examples indicate that. the question night 6iisell ilhe courtsI and, as
1 said before, to siy tint, lie courts ow- doi'lt, have jurisdictioi to
piss on a Presideni's alleged inability isn't. to siy they couldn't. be
given it. by a coilsituioil amendietint.. 
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%Vp considered 11111t. possibility, of (Itwelopill t it lfil lindills whiell
tilt%, I Iresil I oll Vs 1111116111ty Would Ito dMill-Illitted Ply I llik vollr1q, and we
I'll p0t4l ic for thosix vilasons , 1hreo reasons:
Finat, kiliv coill-I ol. jild who 4111 ill 101011(tvil ill ItInkill I Ito original
1111(lill 411o (111 1 validi(
, # 1111glit ho c led 1111oll 
to r y o f
111111, t IWill " lit it vasco ilivz4vilig 110,1611 parflos litigiflit.
A svvoll( 1-ttli'loll is 01,14 wit hillievv 11111C Illiv provedlivo 01111 is
o.,I Ili 11-11 sh m I sl to I III 1 11 IN OvAblo ita-migh ( I I 111mil fill- 4-0111 illgilliclem'- tilld
should Allow tho Viev ProAdOll (4) wistillitt, Prosidoill hil 11OW-61-8 pl-ollipt.-
! v whiln, at I'l-esidmIC is dimbled - .1111d it 14vellied 
to Its v.4pt'vially
11111161,11ml In fillit, of 111111011111 elilergellev, whott"Illo of mir
Courts. whiell mv not, 111) to (IIAN., 11.4 %%'1, litlow, 111  Ilot relidily 61111pit'd
to Invot div.-w liti(I'llexibility. ,
There wits lilloilloir cow-toll wit%* Wt, 1110jeded 11411'.
Mr. Kvvrlml. Thill is. it lim"Aill'-phict" (if 1111di'l-AlilvillOilL
Mr. '1441 (III.Aglied.
The othor I-i'llson \\.it Iviveted it. is lit'villise %%-I- holievil thill. div Iiist
imillilily is till extIVIIHNIP 111111tol. 111141 411olild I)v kv )I it)
(lie movildve bi'lilu'll of the (loverlillivilt, 111111 111lowilig thiv jit(livial
brallell ov, I might .411y. ovell 111v legislative livallell to 11111ke the initialfill(lilig %%-ojlj(I \-joljjlj 11111 (lot'll-ilit% of -.41 1)11 I'll I (I powt-IN., which i'l So
(111111111111111tal to -oul. conglitoliollill s -Slvlll. aild 111loWill f 01116111S
011(sillo the exet'lifivit bl-411101 (4) itil-1101111tv ill (lit, i Ili flilf-det-6ion
Would bt, 'kill -011croad kiliell t. oil - 1) lvsidt lwy ittgelf.
We volisidered "overal othel. suggestioll't 1111d rejeNed llivill oil
Am lilt' gi-millds.
StIvel-111 sliggest !oils, for ilislallev, lilwv beell Offil-NA-fol"I Ile eveMI611
of it spvchil whiell wolild bo vill-IfoWelled , to oifillov
plivsivialls lilld requirki tho 111-tsidoill to sublilic to jill 18101 11111(l 'i'llPi'l I Ill
(AX;i1ilitlatiollst, alld ditt. , 1111tv (lit, exislelleo of lilt hill )il'I(Y by it 11111joriCy
or two-Illirils, Vote, of 01111, commission.
wo coll'sidol-od theso, bill we rititteled thrill 
for a null'il)(NI. of vollsolls.
1 would likol to M1141,
Find, k seemed illmim, to Ils to I'Mablisli fol-11 I Wl"legill l1wellillevy
fol 4101lig it 111-tvWelit, Ilivskill 114id Illmifill vX11101fationg beclulso Oll'S9 , 6 ) -o11111olilits to- placing it (111 trijjl Its 10 Ills
and 111ix Would g1vo a 110,1111v o-0111111W4101i 010 11OW(T 10 11111-11R$ 111111 11(
till timm. Evoll ifthe coil) 1116'.41011 acted ri'likollabiv ill Ow 11111(ter.
which wo might. presume, (here is dw danger of
that, tilt' volillilis,4ioll act 1111d OIRC Illollo wollid- bv ( ellivallilig to (he
President-'s office, --corlainlv so fnr n,.q world -6pinion ivivA concernod- -
eo that. not only would pro;visioll for suell physielli and 111011411 OX41111-
inations Ili,% lilt WrolA to-Ow Presitivia's ptins6al dignity, but. I OiNk
it, would degrade tho Prowsidenfint ollivo itself.
Sevolldiv, wc, I-Opeted these pIRII-A h(VAllso it SC(Illis
t-stabl'U411 it complivateil procediliv Which woll-ld provela Immediate
ac-tioll ill thilp ot pill ergellev. The great. Ileed is for volitillultv ill div
exercis-p-of oxeOllivv power'Of leadonslill) ill thile of crisis, and ilNestign-
tiolls alld hearillp alld fludillp filld votes of it commission, 1 11111
afraid, could dr-ng oil for daYtt, or ()Veil we(+S, tjlld I-it.41111--fil A gff(11-11-
menini crisis, during Which Ito ollol wolild havo tho Clear III-F1111 to
exercise preAdontial power. Moreover, wo boliove that allell - 1101,114,
with newspaper accounts of conflic(hig W.4tiniony of physiviatis alid
others hef6re the Commission, wpuld servo to diWde Public 614111011,
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dlivide tho voi)1111113, v'aw it lh I 1111h n AiI111~ aIil liglit ha~ve serious11
So I blieive IIII (tI le' l)PONAIIres Shiould h)o fle'xible, Anld tley sholild
he pr-ohptAn 11111 it eabrv f100i ~ liuihiiwery 11id ltailed proeedures111l1 it( liuiv'ilOw 01)losiO OLr(e
t-h Itot 0t Ill(% polite, I be1Ieo'e -aiu t hei plati that I present, Ihi,
Iorliliug oil behal11'f of (Ilie l'resleViil s .-t ut t(lie (~u'netr1 fs tv paropei-
lliofdy to 1111 itlo, 11l61g wih'v -lit Viev l'iresident , inl deehiring ai
Presidetilillh. The aiab t.''i ilmt. lift or ll -is till pe('i ke 1h.
I I. ik Ou he Plulent.'sl olinl fal -i-lly-. A dvek~ln 4,4-111is blody allong
witi (If %li 'i't Presoidl(t iq lik~el, to rvveee'iti1AIht a-eefthlue-*1at tlat
('eituuily ohi the'-pil -I.t Of Iiunklig Rii dor t h11I. if tisi groupj neted,- there
wVout~l f ito, (ItI('5t ioul of (l i' ' hI'idllf ii1i4111il wpowe(m]0 the
hli-V OXI, of 11, mht 111 ioi('4)v'e, till%( Cahlel N1H ri t: IIAro onl Olwjob iirild ill a positions to kuuow~ IIt olive whet her t ho )lresidvIII ik ale
to tiet..
Tlhie ( 1 imm~~N, We I-eeiv('( aI iunher of replies to 0our (jtetiohi-
um1ir~e.. )f till ,r,, li'vplies revviv'ed,- I ibbik iotie of tiem involved Ihe
silelt in or i Preasidpiu's ( abiiet aq I lie detninhig ageltcyee
t hat (If fotlulit' IlP141(kitI %oVe ilt) 1118410 thait, suiggt-Stitl, b~ill 1V
wag. (1he 0ily 0110 who ofire(d tha su 40tiIohi.
Am- y'ou ('xIoultiliiig- former 1'u'esidpii( I loove-i-'s- rot her I hall Prues, i-
Mr' ~o':i. I think iI)steit.Ahove I jlt aIS 1 recall, waS
for the ('ahiirt alone, which I votild like to ('rnplnl-ize u t isii plan(hot's itot. proose, althlouigh l tht' havie lti'eii, s01me1 p)r('s.' repjoi to thell
'1h~s )111('011 1 iie (1lie (le('isdit in the Vive Pmremle ., where I
behiteve it. should be. It, onlly says 1 ha1t., ilt doing so, Ile would (to w~tlit
Ie( ordlllarily woild~ do, 1 11n1 SUre, Iluther thle c'irculist Alces, but it
makes It. a re4 uir-enuentll (lint, hto co-iisIIi Ihlie ('1obiin't anld obtaiii tile
al-~Ovial Ill wi-l tliig of (ilie llijoity.
86o, ill other' words5, w'liuit I 11111,j)reaSeuitig to youl 11111' Riot, be ft(i
(jIlait itat ive S011111 fion acorhiug to tile aiiswers to your Iftuestioniuuires,
bilt I beIlieve oll quality it ik (he hewat.
I thilik af study of the' (lafleld'anfjd Wilison cases lidientes that.
Th'ie ( ~iA . I WOIl(l jii5t* lik _e t, e voin answer to tis: Niem-
hers of (lie Vaiiniiet. oire am~~ii~ by (lie, Pesident., of course.
Mr. BhbowsraM. With the advice hu1( consentt of flie Sente.
Tlhe OfA1:0M~AN. Yes. Bitt(hey are apipoinited 1)y (lie President.
'rhtly~ couildiit. get, 111 lindvice and"Conlsentl of (ile Sienae 1unless they
Were liploinit '(I iy (lie PresidhenL
D~on I. they owe it loyalty, at plWsonatl loyalty, to (ile Plresient?
Mr. IIIioNvE.!.. Of'Colsq, everybody Who hans office takes hlis ot~h
of o11100 t hat, Ile will fait hfnl' Jprorm thle (hide' of hlis office under(ile Colnstlit ion, so0 that. their greatest and( highest, loyalty is to tlie
I think it. is Itio l theyio are ordinarily personal friends of (lie
Prldie. '1'Iev are certainly hIk oficin'! 61111ly, and inclined to be
loyal to him, finu( lnt, is til additional reason %Aiy we think it would
1)0 advisablie tW lit~o -themn consulted b~ecauseR, after till, puiblio opinion
is going to dedeo whether or not, this should be (lone, and the firat.
thin g anybody inl this country is goi rg to %%ant( to know Is that the
lPres'ldont,'s friends, at, least., i f eiunable to s-poak for himself, are
tlioie rtlly vonivinlcod tha 1ti8, Is a wigo move; Iothli~sI, Y~ou would
have dI vision nd chaos t il Owtt votflft.So, (lint ia onto i'iispil wo thiik that. is amn sset, to tlina nrtlctilnrl1111-01Mt here would ho it aroop'Opeiikiig whod would [it considered
if voil Nvill; as itritsfl of'tlie 1Pres(it iiild after tliti hatve llblernat PI
on it- IHII tholight it wasI O(hio IL't11Vi to do, )(IOII111 itilit, policy
stalidpolit, it wold hllve, I bldiove-tio (Ittl I it oh lOid linve- rent.
I)ubhl i jepihtie W1110h, of Cillil-$, Is egsetlafl to (lie Siess o th
Th'le (The~MN%''iei loynfty mt voroi0t1i ft'iitgs to) tlile ( t ia
killlit Cause them llto lid, tilt% other way.
liii uk we had dith ande cleatr,3.llyitutet fiiitil, ease of 1te Wilsoit
clibilot. hey ilisL'd to- Celt10 to AM,3 siiehI- - -
Air. O~IW1 u. ~It tho rnson tfhey did t hat, I believe, All% r2hniiltm, %V11 qfl1ite ekitily blilshit' they, weve tileititii RR to
wholei Ow (lie ltir'll~ boti ack it office, ilt thle c'11( of Isdisaitility, mid that. Is thle rolaseit tihl. phtin ti'removes that olinve
nitil Says tight, t tilt% Wgiliiig, before (lte thig litiltitetis, the tnhiii'wthe I'resident i% nblo to net again, he, comc.es biwk.With that kid iof si1ttitioni Ift SA'CiltH (1111(p IOkni to Mue 1110i'0 wollil
ho p 110 htdio, 1 V'iet Pridokt. or 1lie Cablttet itutking thsdecisloit,
Antd thoe Ctht b1) clit' i thellr fliidliue theyim were (lig_ it, otilv
fo Ieteiom 101* elout 011d tat th, 016 ill of the people flint Wle
11tv,411mituti (1 0t 00, Sholild aret votildh bl efrei' latedh.
'rhe (CutintN. 1111111 HAWNnn nature11 bt wind it is, first Volt haveloyalty to theo ("llief, atil sicondly, wit ci k very jut polani , thiev111111, OJISUC loa of jobs- heads m11ay 1). OliOpped 41T if filie I'esideut
eotles h111k; they maitty I10 longer. he t11iteittite of (lt" Ciabilet-iuhd I
think dlia is nimitportant foctor to be coitsidered.
Mr. Buovxmi1. Asstiming O Vice Presidenlt neted aibit tidily.
Yon would have svverAl----
rThe ('111itwx. I have nol roferencev, of ille to1,1 prse1.nttbr
of tlie wresentf ('ihilt.Mr. I111oNt't. NO. No proseiit, perslolnitis Should lip cohisi((ep('1
ill mcoetionl with thlis wltoi (J ll0$timi; biat if flint should( hitllponui,3NVAIuid have (Ito safeguiardI righ t narticle N, thant tOw Progidetit, if
lie was there, eould act, 111ud co~llie, back byn' a wilt(en devinriitioi, mid1(you would hafve, of Collr1se, tie tlill1at letCtioit of (lie imetiieiih-
titetit l~'Cdt~, wh iouldl 1) applIvable, lit cage (lieA('tig i'reslileit
WAtS acting aiim~rily.
'rte (Cauniumv. TIhat 6. where yeu cover it?
Mr. I11owvxFni,. YCA.
'rho% Ca u,%x lutf Ieo doesmi't recover, its ink (li ease of Ga1101eld,thieo would no longer he members of time% Cabliaet.-aid it, L is anice,
TPhe cikim" iknd they would resolve Any doeubhts they hand inlfitvor of thefr Chief, I woulA think, Let's be practical aboot. it.Mr. Bitow~xvm,. -Oki ai hilportry bagis, I. believe- that, would be agroutdlo," fear, Mr. Chnirmani. IMr. M cwam.om. M\r. Chairman; I share somno of your fearg in t hisfield, and I think thint isoeof tlie major decisions thud tl04. committee,
muaL first, r~olve.I tlhik the exipereico of Scecary Lasig is otne (lint must, giv'e
anyone pause, i'egfrdless, of section 4.
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Mr. lhRoWNiIMd,. 'I'lea I evideItly Veiio't gotten I im oilt, across,
becalise ily poiltt Is that history illhcates, to me at least, (Itlt clearly
that tie rasol for 11tis stalealite, for thie failure to act, was becaUse
of the Iliicertniity a to whlehew the PrOie(lelnt couh ever come hack.
If Iam correct in that and we diniige lIth Conislitiltio i hi the mlan-
iter I piOjiS(e, Vou would eliininte tlin. obstHe'l('entirely, nid you
wouhli hove thin n(tling only for tihe duratioti of the iinbillity.
Mr. Ki,:yrli, \[Ir. Altoriily Geiieral,lIo dhirionli, with whoin I
must. sany Inst. venr 1 wan rts t hfer iiliued to be ill agrevI61t., would
leave it.' entirelv to the Vii'e Preshleiit to iiihk( this (etriluhintion.
O1w reason for ilty relctance to rccelpt, that ih thl 1 ('l ii see a danger
there hecalsoe o provide for he president rn,,slmiing his I'residenoy,
if Ile Ii abl to do so, till (lt69r (of a chaotic (olidifiIon by having tie
Vice I'reAhleli. say lI Presie lit. wfas 1znbh, ald the iiext. (lay the
l'r4idetit sayilig, ' ant able" and th-enl (lie Vice President. the next.
day saying ie is amiable, so that you would hnve a (lny-Iy-lday 1resi-
(kilt..
Now, to a lesser degree, it strikes nIh (lat, daigr is iulerent in this
proposal whiclr-leaves it. to tho Vice -Presilent aid Clahinet. If the
Vie I'cresithnt and the Cnlhaiiet de(idet to gahig uI) oi the President,
they might say, "lie is iiiiable,"1 nil~f1ien the next (lay, under your
-proposal, icic'ild-sny, "1-am able to nel.," and unless he fired-the
]illilers of tlie Cbiiel., I hey Would then the next, (lay say lie wastillble.
Thali g s been oiie reason wily I have leaned toward the feeling that.
it. would be hel ttr to liav o' the Cnbiet share in t lie d,eison, but not
to have it. nbsoltelv conclusive, but. to allow the other branches of
the (overnnont, to have a voice il reaching thnt. decision.
Would you coinzlent oil int.?
Is that. a fear which you doi't thiik is serious- that there coul he
a chin6tic situation reslillnu from lils plan?
M1r. fluownsI,. I wouh be ilieid to think it would 1e almost.
nonexistett., for t his reason: Tlat. plublle opinoim is going to decide
this Iiatter in he tlltinate analysis.
No Vice 1Presidpiit canil mtke thi decision unless lie feels that the
country is with him, Conlreas is with hii, nid that public opinion is
wilh hn. If lie does soe de.,rovs himself forever. As a matter of
ftl, even if lie makes a mistake it; hindsight, lie is des roved forever.
So 1.his decision is going to be very deliberately made, nlid it is going(I) be uitnde wi lh the alvice of the* Pregident's official family so that
it will be a serious decision, ad I wouldthink tle Vice 'resident,
realizing th at., the Constitu1ioii says-andl lie takes his oath of office
to support the Consttilotn--he i1s ouly il there oil ai acting basis.
for it teiiporary period, oven afer lie'got in, would act wisely and
with duo regiln1'd to that.; otherwise, ie would destroy himself i tie
field of public opinion id his whole life, official life,'woldd certainly
bte Qopardized, if not. destroyed.
' q is a very powerful ftel or, perhaps the most powerful of all the.
factors th, tcoine into play here.
Mr. WALTR:. Mr. Ilrowelcll, have you given any thought to the
uIdvl sbilitv of having th1e President, when lie feels'he is able to act
agilin, subilit his case to-the Cabinet?
.\Ir1. BtowNE;.. We have, to answer your question directly, yes,
giVen COiisideratio1 to that. We had A di'se1Sioui of thll , and \ felt
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that. flli' jeopl Of (1i0 counftry~ would tint., feel 'q0iit e00 (hgaile about(liePr~hlent-oining bhn 1 thy dto Ilhouit.- tito' l'id~eilt. gouligj ou4t..
'lhov eh'etedl (lIe- Presidlent, of(Pr till. IlThey want. him Iii there. Theyo3
IIV1 vif ngl tor tr'Ist Iitit to make this decision. So As for as hlis comling
back [11to olileo is vouerned, wo fell. there should be' n0 iitrings onl it,
11fl;(llt(i I.% Whitt tile people voted for, And (tillC is what, they wanlt.
TIat. 01idv leaves ( (Ittit'Ilti, ais I see Vt, of tile extrolite shitftion
whieroit 11resioientl Obvioulsh till-Able to lOet., st-ill (ktelmiflhI&I'( to do0 so,
And iii l ai'Cekless si fitio ol flint, kiindt, or one wvhei'e hw retilly wais not
lible to make at rationald (levsion, if (lie' flime or criss wiv; such alint.
action NvWas Ieeoded, yOll v('(101hiiig ill your I," ili helI t I)roveediiig,
Mr. WmiTH-i(. There is (Ilet (ii er case where thle Acting Presidel.
WOU'ilo 0011010 lid( hid e wats going to renlinin .-
hMr. l1iOWvt'iir. YeS.
Mrt' WmaLrm:. And wotld refuse to ae~lt til' Nresdtilt 's repre-
.sV'ntatmonl lie isg Itow%% IIIe to rry oil.
M~r.-BhtOWN.imi,. T1'011 (fillt. IR ano11ther reason1 why rou waint the1
Presidoiolouto to W)1 Ale to iiiko the deIll ttr1tiolii under Seet ion ..
Mr. Fx.itlnAx. Mrt. CJhairman?
Mr. Fl"tAN. lDO YOU not feel (lint. if tile President. oheltirel Ilia
inability an1id tulbsequeitly felt, Ine Was abde, lit' probably. w6ould be ill
veryN secude I ircunuStne? lit that vase, I wonder hti sIibk
opiitionl of which youl speaik mvoilid-1 pe ~trmitted (0t fuituetion.
Mr. I~o~a.Of course, this would all be a mtter of public
record, And perhaps .lie attetition of tite entire Nation would oh of
col.,irse, be focused ont it-, so' tha1t, I (Iin'Lthink Ainy Aspect of it votild
)0 niot, inl full publi, 'view if -1 un4derstland Your questions.
Mr. F10won1A. I ant tlhnking (fIke, most. likely, secluded sitntioti
inl which tile P~resident would findv 1iinseif.
Mr. Bl1owNmu. Yes.
Mr. Th~rntA N. TPhere may he some mini degree: of 110,pit~hi'Aa-
lion -perhiaps.
?dir. ffitow :Pi,. JIMs. place it, lit theo context of present.-day life,
whorm you have Your television Andl your press con (erences and fill,
so- (Il~t, it wouIAt bo very long, if ny mistake was inade, before tho
p~eop~le would' find out, abut it, And( atitoit would be forced]. Now,
.someo askod me, Mr. Chimimnl-
'rho'CAIMN Mr. Attorney Getieral, thlia committee hing a bill
whieh is going to ho considered very shortly. So we wvill Ask you to
concluded as soon As lpossihh'.
Mr. B1uowNvo~u,, 1 ould finish lit 6 miute,if. yon vielt.
Someone asked melt thn question of how this would work, IWho Would
initiated tile Action, whether it. would Ile thle V'ice President or thle
Cabinet. I would like to comment onl that.
'Phe CAinet., under Onte sot of ci rcu istanctes, Could nlot ifv Whe c
President when a majority of that, body believed that thie Pr-esiden t's
inability was sufficient, to w~t'at. aii devohlition of thle Presideittiatl
power on tlhe Vice Presidnt.
Tlhorm is an analogy there. The dabimiet has tilways notified the
Vice President when a President hans (lied, and spetiOn would extend
this custom in thle) case of inability.
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On the other hand, the Vice President. could make the decision to
assume Presidential power, but the constitutional validity of his
decision Would depend Ii-pon the Cabinet,'s approving that decision.
So, it. coll b|e initiated either Way.,
'l'here is also tho jpossililit, that uitnder section 3, th6 Vice Presidont
could take tie lliativo witIoiti the Cabinet, first inviting 1dI_ to
make the decision. Inlike the present provision of the Constitution
howve\'r, this plan, section 3, would require approval of a majority of
the Cabinet, before the Vice Presidellt could undertake tie exercise of
P['sideilal power.
Now, section :3 contains a safeguard against, flie Vice President's
Visible usurpation of power oin a pretext, of inability. A Vice
resident who undtakes (le exercise 1 in other words, of this Pre-si-
dential power, would be assured that his action could not be seriously
branded as usurpati6if, because it. would b approved hI advance by
a majority of the President's own appointees in (te Cabinet.
In ddhtion to the safeguard-provilded by section 3, as one of youc
brought out a momefit ago, section 4 contains a second safeguard be-
caiuse' it. jwoi'ides tha.i Whenever the President declares in writing that
his iinbility is terminated, the President shaill inninedintely resune
the exercise of the powers and duties of his office.
So, I think section 4 provides a disabled President with a constitu-
tionial gunranty that the disabled President can regain the powers of
his office without. tlie conerrence of any other official or any other
group; but. luore iiil)ortant than nn thliig else is the point that I con-
clude with. which I mentioned a moment ago to Congressman Kent-
ing: NMloreimlportant, than' any of the written safeguards areo those
provided by our political processes, for ultimately the operation of
any constitutional arrangement, depends on public'opnion, (I f upon
(li public's processing a certain sense of constititional morality.
In the absence{ of tis sense of constitutional morality on the part
of tli citizenry, there can )e, of course, 110 ularanti against the
usurpation of power or an' cop 4 detat.. II Iot words, no mecian-
ical or procedural soltitn wi h provide a complete answer, if one
iaS.Hiincs I ypotlietical cases in which most of the parties are rogues
an( in which no sense of constitutional propriety exists.
section 5 is merely (ie mechanical provision ?or 7 years for ratif-
cation by the States.
I would conclude my remarks this morning both by thanking the
chairman and the inembters of this subcommittee for their courteous
attention, and expressing my firm belief that the plan presented to
you has the essential ingredients to make anydeeibion under it a just
one, and generally lcceptable to ou people, for history and common-
sense combine to tell usiht this problem should be solved to protect
our Nation in time of ftuttre crisis.
Mr. K ATIN0. Mr. Cliairman, may I make this comment: I have,
as the Attorney Oeneral kinows, offered a legislative suggestion, which
is now 11. R. 6510, calling for a Presidentlt*ldinability Comnssion to
make tlie determination of inability,. I have been very much ini-
pressed with the arguments advanced by the Attornoy General on
behalf of himself and the P'esident., and uiiy mind is very open on (lie
way wo slhould approach thia problem. I f
M , one decision is that it should be approached. I feel the com-
mission plan is the best approach still, but I would be very much
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inclined to prefer, il tle absiseceof any suggest ion at, nil, the stigges-
tion made by the Attorney G0eneral or, hideed, the suggestion made,
by the chnirman or any other of i reasonable nature to solve this
problem.
In order that the Attoney Goneral's views of the Presideutt"s
proposal may be before us in tangibleform, I should be Iapt", to also
offer in the liouse the proposal niade now by the Attorney Gcoral.
Mr. ll1,foWN I.,. Thank you veryimuelh.
'he CilAtRSIAN. I think we will hve committee prints embodyitig
all I)roposals that have beell suggested.
I want to say we are very grateful to you, Mr. Attorney General,
and Mr. lRogers. Your presentation has'been very enlightenitig and
very helpfulio this -omiffiiiee. It has been, I woUild say, on a very
Thith plane, AiMit.i has been exceedingly constructive, and, I am sure.
trill help the mellers come to some conelusion.
I fim inl my study of tile matter there is' perfect answer to this,
that ever' answer lias iiperfeetlbns, and what we must try to do
is to readi the least objectionable solution.
Mr. KT'rlNo. I want to add somelthig else, Mr. Chairman.
T10o CHAIRMAN. Let me say first, before I forget it. I want to put
ii-tie record lhe statemeii f -the coliimittee on1 the ederal Coisti-
tution of the New York StateBar Associatioi on this matter, and ani
editorial that appeared in the Washington Post this morning entitled
"Displacing Ill Presidents."
(Tho'linatter referred to was ordered to be printed in time record, asfollows:)
NVW YORK 81'AT, lIAR AS.OeIATIt)V,
COMMITrFN ON FoI;MMIAI CONSTITUTION,March 2,9, 195i.
lo1. ,MANUM1, CEIVI,
Committee on the J udiciary,
1ous of Representalirts, Washington, D. C.
lI)AR MR. CIm, Fit: As yoti know, 'the committee on the Pederid Cotistitution
of the 'New York State Bar Amoclatton has sttdied the quetloti of Presidential
inability for some months and hits given consideratlon to the many suggestions
made to the Judiclary ubconiitteo oil the Subject.
As a result it is felt by this colilttee that a collsittionai niadnient is
ilecetsarv, and that tht amendment should providee it stibstatice:
(oh That the eommenctment and termination of any Inability should Ix-
determined by such inviliod asr 0og ess hod! by law 1' rovldo; mid(b)l In ease of the hiability of the Presidont, thai the %Ice President should
scceed olyt to he Iperts aiid duties of the office mid ilbt to the office Itself.
It Ws eleat thai I. its presemit form the fifth lase of section 1 of article II of Ihe
Constitution leaves olxmi the matter of determination of what constitutes inability
and fails to authorro anyone to deal either with the beginning or the el of thle
disability. This fact has Ien a matter of embarrassmellt to the governmentt, it
the past and could be a matter of natiofiil ill-&aster in Ithe future.
The question 6f what happens on the death of aPresdent and whether the Vice
President then succeeds to the office or succeeds only to t1to powers and duties of
the office has been settled hv historical tradition. As we all know the Vice Presi-
dent is sworn in as Pr,-.ident upon the death of the latter. Presumably the smie
thing would happen case of the resignation of tile President or of his removal
from office.
On the other hand, it Is not clear whether in case of Presidential inability the
Vice President. would become President or would only be anthorized to act as
President as one succot.'ding to the' powers Vnd (lutlesof tho oiflle. Tile words
"the imme" have iiever beMn contrued i this colnectlioi and this fact adds to
the coifuslon which is so apparent in the recent discusslots on the subject.
It is extremely douibifl whether Congress has Imwer to (Ial wi the matter
without a constitutional amendment and clearly the ambiguity of tie present
provisions camot Ix cured by act of Conress alone.
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Our committee concludes that n constitutional amendtnent Is necessary for
any final or attthoritativ0 solution of the problem and therefore recommends for
your consideration that the fifth clause of section I of article II of the Constitu.
lion should be amended to read as follows:
"In Case of the iehmoval of the Presldentfrom Office, or of hils Death or Resig-
nation, the said Office shall devolve on the Vice President. In Case of the In-
ability of the President to discharge the Powers and Duties of the ld Ofice, the
said Powers and Diuties shall devolve on the Vice President, until the Disability
be removed, The Congress miay by law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation 0r Inability, both ofMthe Presidenti atd Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then be Prsldent, or in Case of Inability net as President. and Such
Officer shall be or act as Presidcint accordingly, until h President shall U, elected,
or, in Case of Inability, until the Disability shall' lx! earlier removed. The
commencement and termination of any Inability shall be determined by such
method as Congress shMI by law provide." "
If this amendnient shall be adopted it would mean that in case of the death,
resignAtion, or removal frnm office of the President., tie Vice President would be
sworn li as President. In cas of the President's Inability, however, the Vice
President would only net as President, having his powers and duties, until the
isability- waaremved. Congress would be called upon to enact legislation
deternini'g the method by which the commencement and termination of any
inability should be detertimbned,
lit view of the antint of time that would necessarily pass before adoption of the
amendment there would be plenty of time for your committee to consider what
method should be adopted by Coiigress. for this determination.
. In cae .of the hiblity of both the President and Vice-President the change
contained in the amendment proposed above is designed to make it plain that
tie officer who shall then act as President shall do so on a temporary basis until
the dlsabilit" is removed or a President elected.
It is believed that. no amendment wA- i ld be suffiielt to meet the problem with-
out providing+ for the determination of the question of commencement and termi-
nation of Iniability of tile President. or the Vice President, or without separating
the provisions relating to inablilty front those relating to death, resignation, or
retovnl,'thus removing the ambiguity Involved in the present language,
I sincerely hope that the foregoing will be of assistance to you and your coin-
mittee In your consideration of his vital subject, and I atn enclosing additional
copies of this letter for the other members of the subcommittee, and am sending
further copies to the committee's general counsel.
Respectfully and sincerely yours,
CORNELIUS V. JIIOKERSIIA, Chairman.
iFrom the Washington Post, April 1, 19571
DISPLACINO ILL PRESIDENTS
Beverly Smith, Jr,, Washington editor of the Saturday Evening Post, takes us
to task- in a letter published on this pago today for casting doubt on the effieacy
of his proposed Presidential Powers Cmmnismlon. In his recent article In that
magazine, Mr. Smith offered his plan tinder tile title of "Smith's Two Cents
Worth." But now he ha. substantially raised his price and urges its acceptance
Ms a means of plucking the flower of national safety out of the nettle of danger.
We fail to see any such promilo lit he proposed Presidential Powers Commission.
That body-somewhat similar to the Presidential Inability Commnqlon in Repre-
.entative Keating's bill-would be composed of three members of the Supreme
Court, the Secretaries of State and Treasury, the majority and minority leaders of
the Senate, and the Speaker and minority leader of the lious. Any time it might
find the President temporarily unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office it could install the Vice President as acting Presi'dent. W hen and if the
commisWion should find the President's disability removed, it could restore his
powers to him.
In displacing the President the commission would have to act by. a two-thirds
vote. WoUld it also take two-thirds of tile commission to restore the President
to his office? If so, 4 of the 0 members all of whom might be of the opposite
political party, could prevent a recovered President from regaining the otilee to
which the people had elected him.
Other grave questions must he asked about the proposed PPC. For instance,
would the Cihai nian, who would be the Chief Justice, be the only person who
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could call it In session in case of a presidential Illness? Any Chief Justice would
be most reluctant to intervene in the affairs of the President. Mr. Snitb seems
to assume that such a C6mmission would have relieved President Wilson of his
duties and powers during his illness. We seriously doubt that Chief Jistice
White would have Initiated such a course of action, and if a Commission had
attempted 16Aisplace Wilsoi in the tense atmosphere of the fight over the League
of Nations he would certainly have resisted with all his power. An appalling
fight over the Presidency might have been the result.
In our opinion, the best prospect of relieving the Nation's plight in that situa-
tion would have ben a clearly established rule that the Vice President could
fill in temporarily without acceding to the presidential office. Mr. Smith may
be right in assuming that Wilson would not have invited the Vice President to
take over In any event, but there is even less probability that he would have
bowed to a Commission s edict without a potentially perilous struggle.
The existence of such a Commission would be a constant source of Irritation
to any PreSident. Every time a Democratie President might be temporarily
ill or might haVe to undetko an operation, a Republican Speaker or leader in the
Senate could badger the Chief Justice about summoning the Presidential Powers
Commission. The Chief Justice would be accused of acting or (ailing to act out
of partisan motives. One of the most serious objections to the whole scheme is
that it would plunge the Supreme Court into political imbroglios.
In sum, the proposed PPC would raise more doubt and uncertainty that it
would remove about national leadership in case of disability on the part of the
President. For that reason it. is dangerous. A much safer proposal on this
subject is the one favored by President Eisenhower-which would permit the
Vice President to act as a substitute for the President at the latter's request.
We are glad to note that Mr. Smith also favors this plah even though he thinks
it does not go far enough. Mr. Eisenhower's additional plan of having the Cabi-
net decide the disability issue when the President himself could not Is provoking
about as much controversy as the Commission idea has done.
Mr. KATIiNO. Irmight say, parenthetically, I understand that this
committee of the New York State Bar Association doesn't agreo with
anybody on this problem, which is par for this course; but I do want
to add 'this, Mr. Attorney General, and this is an encomitiu of the
chairman; in light of this statement that this has been held on such
a high level; I want to call your attention to the fact that this com-
mittee sat. and heard a large volume of evidence on this subject last,
year, toward the end of the session, and the chairman agreed with
those of us on our side that, iv was an inappropriate and Indelicate
time to bring up that. subjeotathat timn, a1( any political advantage
which he or his party might have derived from it was completely
divorced from his mind, alid we agreed together that we would take
it up in a very serious way in this session.
I want to say I commend the chairman most highly for that
attitude.
Mr. BROWNHLi,. I would like to add my appreciation to that.
Mr. WALMER. I think this indicates the quandry of the members of
this subcommittee, because we have been wrestling with this thing
since 1955, and I think all of us have tho same views that we had when
we initially undertook a solution.
Mr. BnoWNELL. It is a hard problem, but this subcommittee can
handle it., I am sure.
Tho' ChAIRMAN. Have you seen this brochure the committee isued
on the Presidential (i|sabilitv?
Mr. BROWNELL. We have. We just received one this mnornimtg,
Mr. Ciairmnn.
Mr. BRooKs. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. BrooKs. Mr. Attorney General, on page 21 of your testimony
you indicated that you beloved thpt to allow the jlidicial or legis-
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lative officers to make the initial determination would be violative
of the, Constitufion, or would not be, constitutional. ,Do you thilik
that is true ii light of your restatement on pago 12 of iho second part
of paragraph 6, where it states very clearly in the Constitution that
"the Congress may by law provide for the case of-removal, death,
resignation, or inability, both of the President ai(d Vice'President"?
Mr. BnOWNE'LL. I have twO comments on that. lFirst, that point
that you just mltioned, that is a case specifically where lthe Consti-
tution says in case both th P'resident and the Vice President are out,
there cat be a succession law by statute.
The question we are raising is on the first part of thf' t scction
which does not m intion Congress acting, but I do not intend to say
the Constitution could not be amended to provide that type.of
situation where. Congress or the judiciary might participate in this
decision.
Of course, you could have a constitutional amendment, but my
point there was rather to the policy involved.
We have always endeavored to maintain this strict separation -of
powers between the three branches, and this seems to be peculiarly
an executive-branch decision.
Mr. BROOKS. Then'you don't think it would actually be unconstitu-
tional for congressional officers to participate in such a decision?
Mr. BROWNELL. I think the Constitution could be amended to pro-
vide that.
Tio CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?
Thauk you, Mir. Attorney General.
(Wherehpon" at 11:48 a. i., thblhearing was adjourned, subject to
call of the Chair.)
(The following was later submitted for the record:)
COMMITTEE ON TilE JUDICIARY, lIousE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
On April 1, 1957, a statement-.on Presidential inability was presented to your
subcommittee by the Attorney General. Shortly before that the committee on
Federal Constitution of the New York State Bar Association presented to your
subcommittee a suggested amendment deal ng with that problem. It did'not thet
have before it the recommendations of the Attorney General. However it agrees
with fim that in removal, death and resignation the office devolves bt4 that in the
case of l6bility the duties and not the offle6 doolve upon the Vice President, that
such Inability may be terminated, resulting in the President taking up his duties.
It agrees that a constitutional amendment Is the best solution. It Is true that bv
usage in those cases where it was impossible for the President to return, the Vice
President has taken the oath of office, although there is no specific constituiqgnI
sanction therefor. A constitutional amendment would forever remove do ut asto
this. Such diverse views have been expressed on the question of whether Congress
has the power-to legislate on Inability that it may be contemplated that if such
power were exercised by virtue of an act of Congress without constitutional
sanction it would be tested In the courts. For those reasons the committee has
advocated constitutional amendment.
Our subcommittee on Presidential inability, of which I am the chairman, and
Messrs. Elihu Root, Jr., and Arthur H. Dean are the other members, have not met
since the statement of the Attorney General so there has been time for informal
discussions only. Hence this memorandum Is submitted as an expression of my
own views although in general concurred In by the others.
While the Attorney tCeneral advocates constitutional amendment, he does to
on a completely different ground. His expressed view is that the Vice President
could not be divested, without cons(itutIonal amendment, of the power of deter-
mination which he now has. The reason for divesting him of that power is that
he should be given a more limited power to declare inability and then oldy with
the consent of a majority of the cabinet who are executive 6fficers. ThigInemo-
randun is not primarily concerned with the policy of how to deal with the question
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of [inability bt is submitted In the hope that it may offer sonic suggestions to
those having responsibility as to the Interpretatiou 'of the Constitution. It is
submitted that the interpretation of the Vice President's power advocated by
the Attorney Ceneral and his recommendation ias to the Cabinet acting with the
ViCe Presideit could not have bren within the contemplation of the~framersfor
the following reasons:
First it would lhave been a simple matter to have mid that the determination
of iltbfilitv should bet made hv the Vice President. The debates rather indicate
that they avoided who was t; ralse and delernifne Inability. Nor was it likely
that the' framers expected thatthe Vice President would act deterred either by.
fear of the accusati6i of usumpatlon or reluctance, induced by loyalty. Also the
exercise of such a power without explicit direction would haVe ticeii'made at his
peril and ight lead to an extraordinary situation in sonic cases as for example,
where the President'declared hinslf al;le to perform or resum.."h is dulies.
Second, at the time the Constitution was adopted, the Vice President was the
candidate who received the second largest number of votes. The supporters of
the rival candidates held quite strongly divergent views which very soon crystal-
lized Into a party organization. It seenfs unlikely that it was fit the put'viow of
the draftsnan tiat a recently defeated candidati for President, then serving hs
Vi66 President, should be gtoer po w er under any circunstances to determine the
ability of the successful candidate to perform iA duties.
Of course, it could not have been within the purview of the framers that the
Cabinet should have aniy responsibility in the matter as the Cabinet was not
then 'created.
As against the view that this power has been held since 1787 it should be con-
sidered that, (a) it has never ben exercised, possibly for the reason that It was
feared that the office would be vacated; (b) tht it required consremional letioa
to implement it; (c) that such implied power was not sufficiently recognized tojustify reliance on it.
The Attorney General argues that the Vice President has always had this power.
lie does not deal with the troublesome question which would arise if a President
and a Vice Presidekit lis amlrcd on the riqht of deternination. Ilis argument is
based on theqpientise that sicethe Vieo President has the duty of acting III certain
contingecies he Is clothed with th -- dut todeterhmine when that contingency
exists. It does not, of course, so state'ih the Constitution but the Attornev'
General contends that it is a well established rule of law that a contingent power
gives its grantee the right to determine when to exercise it. In support of this
legal generalization four cases are cited. (See citation 26 to Attorney General's
memorandum.)
There was sustained iiI the Aurora case in 1813 the President's right to proclaim
termination of embargo in'the Martin ease in 1927 to calling out the militia and
in the Field case in 8i1 and the Hampton ease In 1928 the right to determine
changing state of facts to vary tariff. Each of the above acts was done in pur-
suance of express authority given the President by Congre-m. This is an entirely
different matter from saying that power may be'inplied where express direction
is not given.
The logical conchsion fi the interpretAilon of any constitutional language
directing that something be done would be that someone was directed to do it.
Unfortunately that does tiot appear to be so here unless Congress mder its broad
powers was expected to Implement it. If by inference it was expected that
anyone liad the power withoutt congressional implementation it is submitted that
it would be more likely to be the President himself at least where he was able and
willing. The view of the Attorney General is that It requires constitutional
amendment to give the President this power and a constitutional amendment to
divest the Vice President of a power which lie always had And apparently the
President'never had. It is submitted that not for this reason but for clarification
a constitutional amendment should be adopted to settle the question of succession
too 'ce where the 'resident cannot resume Ills duties and of devolution of duties
where he may be able to.
April 0, 1957. MARTIN TAYLOR.
Copy for Information of Attorney GceWra[ Cornelius W. Wickersham, Bar
Association Committee Chairman; Arthur 11, beau, Esq.; Elihu Root, Jr., Rsq.
